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According to our current conception of physics, any valid physical theory is supposed to describe
the objective evolution of a unique external world. However, this condition is challenged by quantum
theory, which suggests that physical systems should not always be understood as having objective
properties which are simply revealed by measurement. Furthermore, as argued below, several other
conceptual puzzles in the foundations of physics and related fields point to limitations of our cur-
rent perspective and motivate the exploration of an alternative: to start with the first-person (the
observer) rather than the third-person perspective (the world).
In this work, I propose a rigorous approach of this kind on the basis of algorithmic information
theory. It is based on a single postulate: that universal induction determines the chances of what any
observer sees next. That is, instead of a world or physical laws, it is the local state of the observer
alone that determines those probabilities. Surprisingly, despite its solipsistic foundation, I show
that the resulting theory recovers many features of our established physical worldview: it predicts
that it appears to observers as if there was an external world that evolves according to simple,
computable, probabilistic laws. In contrast to the standard view, objective reality is not assumed on
this approach but rather provably emerges as an asymptotic statistical phenomenon. The resulting
theory dissolves puzzles like cosmology’s Boltzmann brain problem, makes concrete predictions for
thought experiments like the computer simulation of agents, and suggests novel phenomena such
as “probabilistic zombies” governed by observer-dependent probabilistic chances. It also predicts
some basic phenomena of quantum theory (Bell inequality violation and no-signalling) and suggests
a novel “algorithmic” perspective on the foundations of quantum mechanics.
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2 1. Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION
Theoretical physics is more than just a fixed framework
that allows us to predict measurable quantities. Ever since
the first philosophers have wondered what our universe is
made of, the very nature of the questions that we ask in
physics has been continuously evolving. Novel discoveries
and problems have led to completely new concepts that did
not even make sense within earlier theories. For example,
the problem of ether and of the Lorentz transformations in
electrodynamics have ultimately led us to a framework (rela-
tivity) in which the structure of spacetime itself is dynamical,
which is an idea that could not even have been formulated
within Newtonian mechanics.
The starting point of this work is the hypothesis that we
are perhaps at a point where we may want to consider an-
other substantial revision of some traditional aspects of our
worldview, at least in certain contexts. We are facing several
conceptual problems, some of them of enormous importance,
for which systematic problems and difficulties arise when we
try to address them with standard approaches. While some
of these questions are simply free-floating expressions of hu-
man curiosity (like “Why are there simple laws of physics at
all?”), others have emerged as notorious and persistent prob-
lems in physics and related areas. They seem to show us in
a rather annoying way that there is something that we fun-
damentally do not understand (see Table 1 for an overview).
For example, consider some questions that are currently
being discussed in the context of cosmology: what if the uni-
verse is really large (as in eternal inflation) and contains a
multitude of copies of every observer [1]? How can we assign
probabilities to properties of “possible worlds” [2]? What if
thermal fluctuations produce a massive amount of randomly
appearing “Boltzmann brains” [3–5] — can we use the as-
sumption that we are not the result of such fluctuations to
constrain our cosmological models? Independently, philoso-
phers are discussing questions related to agents or observers
that seem at first sight to be of a very different category,
like: What happens if we simulate an intelligent agent on a
computer — would the simulation be “alive” [11]?
Even though these puzzles seem to be of quite different
nature at first sight, they do have a common core — they
are all specific instances of the question: “What will I see
next?” In the empirical regime, physics allows us to answer
this question, at least probabilistically. For example, if we
send a photon to a half-silvered mirror in the laboratory, then
quantum physics tells us that we will see the photon being
transmitted (or rather hear a specific detector click) with
50% probability. But we can ask this question also in exotic
situations, some of which are listed in Table 1. For example,
if we are promised to be scanned in all detail to a computer,
and then to be simulated in one (or even many different)
virtual worlds, will we “wake up” in a simulation (and, if
so, in which one)? In this context, it seems inappropriate to
try to answer the question in boldface solely on the basis of
information about the detailed physical composition of body
or computer. Instead, the question now seems to fall into
the realm of the philosophy of mind.
Similarly, if we assume the validity of a cosmological model
predicting a universe with a large number of Boltzmann
brains, does it make sense for me to hold a degree of be-
lief on whether I am actually one of them? Can we assign a
meaningful probability to the possibility that what I see next
is the strange experience of one of those fluctuating beings,
perhaps suddenly realizing that something is very strange be-
fore disappearing? Conversely, can we use the empirical fact
that this is not what we see to rule out some cosmological
models? The very existence of controversy among cosmolo-
gists regarding these questions tells us that we have no idea
how to approach them in a conclusively coherent way.
From this perspective, it seems odd that a single unifying
question has to be approached with so different methods in
the different regimes — physics, philosophy, or outright spec-
ulation. But is this actually a fair comparison? Isn’t physics,
after all, more concerned with the question of “What is the
world like?” rather than “What will I see next?” Not if
we live in a quantum world. Ultimately, the formalism of
quantum theory tells us the probabilities of outcomes of ex-
periments, i.e. the chances of what to see next, given the
physical context. In particular, due to results like Bell’s
theorem [16, 17], it is provably inconsistent to assume that
measurements simply uncover preexisting unknown facts of
the world, without sacrifizing other important principles of
physics like locality. We should not think of the wave func-
tion as the “configuration of the world” in a naive sense, but
rather as a catalogue of expectations about what an agent
will see next. Therefore, quantum theory gives us a physical
motivation to regard the question in boldface above as more
fundamental than the question of what the world is like.
• Quantum theory. “Unperformed experiments have
no results” [6, 7]; measurement problem [8]; no-go re-
sults about observer-independent facts [9, 10].
• Cosmology. Boltzmann brain problem [3, 4]; self-
locating uncertainty [1]; measure problem [2].
• Philosophy of mind / future technology. “Are
you living in a computer simulation?” [11], puzzles of
personal identity like “A Conversation with Einstein’s
Brain” in Hofstadter’s and Dennett’s “The Mind’s
I” [12], or Parfit’s teletransportation paradox [13].
• Fundamental curiosity. Why is there a “world” with
“laws of nature” in the first place?
−→ start with conditional probabilities
P(next observer state | current observer state).
TABLE 1. Some enigmas that motivate the approach of this
paper. As explained in more detail in the main text, even though
these conceptual puzzles are rooted in different fields, they have
a common feature: they can all in principle be reformulated in
terms of the question of what is the probability of my future state,
given my current state (including my momentary observations
and memory, conscious or not). This motivates the attempt to
formulate a framework for which these first-person conditional
probabilities are fundamental, and which does not assume that
they come from an external world.
Given that this single question appears in so many in-
stances in different fields — could there be a single, unified
approach or theory that answers this question in all con-
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texts uniformly? Such a theory would have an important
advantage: while most ad hoc claims about problems like the
brain emulation question above do not seem to be directly
amenable to empirical testing1, the hypotheses of such a uni-
fied approach about these exotic phenomena could be put to
an indirect test. Namely, if that theory made in principle suc-
cessful empirical predictions in the regime of physics, then
this would justifiably increase our trust in its predictions in
the more speculative regime.
The goal of this work is to provide a proof of principle that
we can indeed have a theory2 of this kind — one that is sim-
ple, rigorous, and well-motivated. We arrive at such a theory
quite naturally by following a few well-motivated assump-
tions. Our first assumption is to committ to the first-person
perspective of observers3 as being fundamental. In more de-
tail, we start with what we call the “observer state”: a math-
ematical formalization of the information-theoretic state of
the observer, including its current observations and its mem-
ory (conscious and unconscious). This will be our primitive
notion, and we will drop all assumptions of an “external
world”. A moment’s thought shows that such a move is
unavoidable if we want to address questions like those men-
tioned above. For example, if we ask “why is there a “world”
with “laws of nature” at all?, then we must have a starting
point that does not assume the existence of such a world
from the outset. Similarly, if we do not think that detailed
insights into physical properties of the world can help us re-
solve puzzles like Parfit’s teletransportation paradox, then
we must be able to argue without these ingredients.
Given such a notion of “observer state”, we can formulate
a possible answer to the question of “what the observer will
see next”: namely, we would like to write down some notion
of propensity, or chance,
P(next observer state | current observer state). (1)
Our second assumption is that this chance [30] always exists,
and that there is a mathematical object P that formalizes
it. For the moment, think of P as a probability distribution;
later on, its role will in fact be played by a more general
object (a countable set of asymptotically equivalent distri-
butions). Consider the following example. Suppose that x
1 After all, we cannot directly empirically test any predictions of the
form “Yes, if we do a simulation of this or that kind, then the sim-
ulated mind really has an inner life in the same way that we do”.
Simply observing the simulated mind, or asking it, will not allow us
to draw any ultimate conclusions; see e.g. the philosophical discus-
sion of “zombies” [32]. Of course we can (and should) study other
aspects of this problem empirically, e.g. via neuroscience.
2 Note that this is not supposed to be a “theory of everything”; in fact,
the theory predicts its own limitations. By construction, it will have
to say nothing about most things. As an obvious example, it will not
be useful for the search for a theory of quantum gravity.
3 In line with Rovelli [14], here the word “observer” is by no means
restricted to human observers, and it is not (at least not directly) re-
lated to the notion of “consciousness”. The question of consciousness
is irrelevant for this paper; my notion of “first-person perspective”
is by no means meant to be equivalent to consciousness. The former
(but probably not the latter) describes a very general, technically
formalizable notion that is agnostic about the question “what that
perspective really feels like”. As a rough analogy, note that computer
science can reason about the information content of a painting (say,
after it is digitized and saved on a hard drive) without the need to
decide what it is supposed to depict, or whether it is “beautiful”.
describes the state of an observer who knows that she will
now be put to sleep, scanned, and simulated in a computer.
Let y be the observer state that she would have at the first
moment of computer simulation. Then what we assume here
is that there is in fact an “objective chance” P(y|x) that the
observer will “wake up” in the simulation. Moreover, this
notation implies that this chance is independent of all other
“facts of the world” — it really only depends on the state of
the observer.
It is important to understand that P is not meant to rep-
resent the observer’s degree of belief. As a colourful and
imprecise example, suppose that x describes the state of a
little insect that is crawling across the edge of a table. Then
(we think that) there is a large chance P(y|x) of transition-
ing into a state that experiences falling, even if the insect
is too stupid to hold beliefs (let alone to compute probabili-
ties). Moreover, the observer state should be interpreted as
encompassing all information “contained in” the observer,
not just what the observer is consciously aware of. In this
example, x could contain enough information from the in-
sect’s nervous system to indicate in principle the presence of
the table’s edge, even if the insect is not aware of it.
Finally, to obtain a complete theory, we have to concretely
postulate what P should be. As mentioned above, P will
be something like (but not quite) a probability distribution.
In order to obtain a meaningful, mathematically formalized,
objective theory, it should not be necessary to determine
what it “feels like” to be in a particular observer state x
in order to determine P(y|x). Instead, P(y|x) should only
depend on the abstract information content of x and y, and
not on questions of qualia. As we will explain in Section 2
and motivate in detail in Section 3, we will here postulate
that P should express some form of “universal induction”:
P(y|x) is large if an external rational agent with complete
knowledge of x would be led to predict y. This will lead us to
claim that P is some version of algorithmic probability. Such
P is related to description length: the more compressible the
conceivable future state y (given the current state x), the
more likely. Thus, in the approach of this paper, answering
the brain emulation question above boils down to estimating
the algorithmic complexities of the simulated observer states.
We study this problem in detail in Subsection 6.2.
The theory is introduced in two successive steps, distin-
guished by their color shading:
I. Mathematical formulation
Sections 2 (algorithmic probability) and 3.
II. Predictions of the theory
Sections 4–7.
Section 2 will introduce the notions of observer states and
algorithmic probability. Section 3 spells out the postulates of
this paper’s approach, and motivates why algorithmic prob-
ability is our measure of choice.
The second part reconstructs aspects of physics from the
postulates, and uses them to address some of the puzzles of
Table 1. While our methodological starting point is in some
sense solipsistic, Section 4 shows how we can nevertheless
understand the existence of an external world with simple
computable probabilistic laws of physics as a consequence
of this framework. Furthermore, Section 5 proves that we
also obtain an emergent notion of objective reality. Sub-
sections 5.2 and 5.3 argue, however, that there are extreme
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situations in which objective reality breaks down, leading
to the phenomena of “probabilistic zombies” and “subjec-
tive immortality”. Section 6 describes how the Boltzmann
brain problem gets dissolved, and what we can say about the
computer simulation of agents. Finally, Section 7 shows that
some basic phenomena of quantum theory are to be expected
in this framework, before we conclude in Section 8.
2. ALGORITHMIC PROBABILITY
There are two main notions mentioned in the introduction
that we have to discuss in all mathematical details: the state
of an observer, and the chance P. We will begin by stip-
ulating that observer states shall be modelled by the finite
binary strings:
S = {ε, 0, 1, 00, 01, 10, 11, 000, . . .}.
The length of a string x ∈ S will be denoted `(x); for ex-
ample `(11) = 2. The symbol ε denotes the empty string
of length zero. We will assume that every possible observer
state corresponds to a binary string; and, vice versa, to ev-
ery binary string there is a corresponding observer state, i.e.
“state of being” of a conceivable observer. As explained in
the introduction, we should think of an observer state as an
exhaustive description of an observer’s memory (conscious or
unconscious) and momentary observations — all her “locally
accessible information”. Naively, think of a raw dump of the
information-theoretic content of a human brain at some mo-
ment in time, scanned up to all functionally relevant detail.
Now, this is not an exact interpretation. To what detail ex-
actly are we supposed to scan? Where exactly do we put
the boundaries of the brain? In the following, we will see
that we do not need to answer these questions to construct
our theory and to extract its predictions. Moreover, the in-
terpretation of an observer state will gradually become more
clear in the course of construction of the theory.
It is important to understand that most observer states are
completely unrelated to states of humans or animals. (This
is a truism as obvious as stating that “almost all theoretically
possible digital pictures do not show anything that you are
familiar with”.) We have to, may, and will ignore questions
of qualia like “what does it feel like to be in state x”? More-
over, the actual zeroes and ones in an observer state do not
carry any meaning in isolation. This is comparable to, say,
the theory of general relativity, where coordinates of space-
time points like x = (0, 0.3,−0.14, 1.25) do not carry any
meaning in themselves, but only relative to a choice of coor-
dinate system. While general relativity allows for a mostly
arbitrary choice of coordinate system, we will see in Section 3
that we also have a mostly arbitrary choice of encoding, and
changing the encoding will change the bit string.
Since observer states are discrete, it makes sense that the
state of the observer changes in discrete (subjective) time
steps. That is, every observer will be in some state now, in
another state next, and so on. This leads us to study tran-
sition probabilities of the form P(y|x) (as indicated in (1)).
Before trying to define these, however, it turns out to be
much easier to study unconditional probabilities P(x) of bit
strings x: we can apply known results from algorithmic in-
formation theory to define and analyze these.
To this end, let us start with some intuition. We would
like to postulate a probability measure P that determines
the chances of what observers see. How can we do so, with-
out making arbitrary choices or smuggling known facts of
physics into the definition? I will argue in the following that
a version of algorithmic probability is a good candidate, since
it uses only structure that is unavoidably there once we start
to reason logically: the computability structure of axiomatic
systems. While a more detailed discussion of the motivation
will be deferred to Section 3, this subsection will now ap-
peal to intuition, and at the same time derive and present a
definition of algorithmic probability.
Let us step back for a moment and recall some basic
ideas from probability theory. When students start to learn
stochastics at school, often the first example they discuss is
that of an “urn”, containing balls that have different colors,
and of some experimenter drawing one of the balls at ran-
dom. In our case, the differently colored balls correspond to
the observer states, i.e. the finite binary strings. Also, bit
strings are purely mathematical objects, so in some sense,
mathematics itself represents the analog of the urn, or, say,
the formal axiomatic system that is used to define the no-
tion of a “binary string”. But what corresponds to the act
of “drawing” such a mathematical object at random?
Intuitively, the concrete mechanism of drawing determines
the resulting probability distribution. If the urn contains two
red balls and a green ball, say, then the chance of drawing
the green ball will only be close to 13 if the experimenter has
equal access to all the balls (for example, none of the balls
lies at the bottom of the urn and cannot be reached by the
experimenter), if she moves her arm uniformly inside the urn
in a pseudo-random fashion, and if she does not see, feel or
detect the color of the balls in any way4. On the other hand,
if one of the balls is in some sense “easier to draw” (say, there
are 3 balls, and 2 of them are hidden in the urn’s corners),
then the chance of drawing that ball will be higher.
How can we “draw” a finite binary string? If we are look-
ing for a “natural” mechanism that is not just chosen ar-
bitrarily from all conceivable mechanisms, then we should
only use structures that are given to us apriori — that is,
ones that are supplied by mathematics itself. Mathematics
constitutes the “urn” that contains the finite binary strings,
and supplies mechanisms for drawing them. In a mathemat-
ical formal system, we can “draw” a mathematical object by
describing it. That is, we can write down a definition, based
on the axioms of our formal system, and thereby selecting
a mathematical object from the “urn” of all mathematical
objects.
Thus, our random experiment might be performed by a
mathematician, equipped with paper and pencil, who draws
finite binary strings by describing them. Some strings are
much easier to describe than others, even if they contain
more bits. For example, the binary string
x := 00000 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
a million zeroes
4 What I write here has only motivational value; I do not claim to say
anything profound about the foundations of probability theory.
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is easy to describe — in fact, we have just described it (and it
remains easily describable even if we demand a more formally
sound way, say, a definition according to the rules of a fixed
formal system). Similarly, it is easy to describe the string
xpi := 0010001000011111101 . . .
containing the first 106 binary digits of pi. Some strings are
much more difficult to describe, like
xc := 010010100010000011110 . . .
which is a concrete structureless string of 1000 bits, gener-
ated by a thousand tosses of a fair coin. The simplest way
to describe the string by mathematical means seems to be
to write it down bitwise, which arguably needs more effort
(and more paper space) than the previous two strings.
So the strings x and xpi seem to be easier to describe, and,
according to our urn metaphor, easier to “draw” than xc,
for example. Hence they should have larger probability with
respect to the distribution that we are looking for.
But how can we formalize this idea? How can we “de-
scribe a string at random” and get a meaningful probability
distribution? The idea of a mathematician, randomly writ-
ing down definitions on a piece of paper, is clearly not formal
enough to determine a well-defined distribution.
It turns out that there is a precise formal definition of this
very idea, which is known as algorithmic probability. The
main insight is as follows: every step of formal manipulation
performed by the mathematician can also be done by a uni-
versal computing machine. Thus, instead of asking how easy
it is for a mathematician to write down a definition of a bi-
nary string, we can ask how easy it is to program a universal
computer to output the corresponding string.
I will now give a brief introduction to algorithmic infor-
mation theory and probability which is mainly based on the
book by Hutter [31]. I will be concise and focus only on
those aspects that are relevant for the present paper, assum-
ing that the reader is familiar with some basic notions of
theoretical computer science (e.g. the Turing machine, the
halting problem, and computability). A more detailed and
pedagogical introduction can be found in the book by Li and
Vita´nyi [46], see also [47].
One of the basic models of computation is the Turing ma-
chine [48], consisting of several (input, work and output)
tapes carrying some data given by bits, a finite state ma-
chine, and some read-write-heads pointing to a single cell on
each tape and giving the position where to read or write next.
In accordance with [31], we shall only consider Turing ma-
chines with one unidirectional input tape, one unidirectional
output tape (to be generalized later), and several bidirec-
tional work tapes. “Input tapes are read only, output tapes
are write only, unidirectional tapes are those where the head
can only move from left to right. All tapes are binary (no
blank symbol), work tapes initially filled with zeros.”
Now we distinguish two different possible events: first, the
Turing machine T might halt and output a fixed, finite binary
string x ∈ S. Second, the Turing machine T might compute
a possibly infinite bit string without ever halting; in this
case, we may still observe that the output string starts with
a finite bit sequence x ∈ S. This is due to the fact that
the output tape is assumed to be unidirectional. We use the
definition given in [31]:
Monotone TM. We say T outputs/computes a string
starting with x ∈ S on input p ∈ S, and write T (p) = x∗
if p is to the left of the input head when the last bit of x is
output (T reads all of p but no more). T may continue oper-
ation and need not halt. For given x, the set of such p forms
a prefix code. We call such codes p minimal programs.
Now we are ready to define the crucial concepts of Kol-
mogorov complexity and algorithmic probability:
Definition 2.1 (Algorithmic probability and complexity).
Let T be any monotone Turing machine. The monotone
complexity or (monotone) Kolmogorov complexity of a string
x ∈ S with respect to T is given by
KmT (x) := min{`(p) | T (p) = x∗}
or by ∞ if no such program p exists. Moreover, define the
algorithmic probability that T outputs some string that starts
with x ∈ S by
MT (x) :=
∑
p:T (p)=x∗
2−`(p).
Since the set of programs p such that T (p) = x∗ is prefix-
free, it follows from the Kraft inequality that MT (x) ≤ 1
for all x. This expression can be interpreted as the proba-
bility that T outputs a string that starts with x if the input
is chosen by tossing a fair coin. In more detail, MT is a
semimeasure in the sense of the following definition:
Definition 2.2 (Measures and semimeasures [31]).
A function m : S → R+0 is called a semimeasure if m(ε) ≤ 1
and m(x) ≥ m(x0) + m(x1), and a probability measure if
equality holds in both cases.
We define the conditional (semi)measure as
m(y|x) := m(xy)
m(x)
(x, y ∈ S)
if m(x) 6= 0, where xy denotes the concatenation of x and y.
One of the most important facts in computer science is
the existence of “universal computers” that are capable of
simulating every other computer. That is, if U is a universal
computer and T an arbitrary computer, then every program
for T can easily be “translated” into a program for U which
generates the same output:
Theorem 2.3 (Universal Turing machine [31]). There ex-
ists a universal monotone Turing machine U which simulates
every monotone Turing machine T in the following sense: to
every T , there is a finite binary string xT ∈ S such that
T (p) = U(xT p),
where xT p denotes the binary string obtained by concate-
nating xT and p.
Since a universal Turing machine U can simulate every
other machine, its monotone complexity measure KmU is
“optimal” in the sense that KmU (x) ≤ KmT (x)+cT for every
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Turing machine T , where cT ∈ N is a constant that does
not depend on x. A similar inequality holds for algorithmic
probability: we have
MU (x) ≥ c′T ·MT (x), (2)
where c′T > 0 is another constant not depending on x. In
algorithmic information theory, these optimality inequalities
are then used as a motivation to choose an arbitrary universal
Turing machine U , and to define all the relevant quantities
with respect to that machine:
Definition 2.4. Fix any universal monotone Turing ma-
chine U , and set Km(x) := KmU (x) and M(x) := MU (x).
The resulting measures do not depend too much on the
choice of U ; in particular, if U and W are both universal,
then MU and MW can be estimated against each other in
both directions by a multiplicative constant as in (2). This
kind of “weak” machine-independence will be of high rel-
evance for the theory of this paper, as we will discuss in
Section 3.
FIG. 1. Sketch of a monotone Turing machine T . The machine
reads some (possibly infinite) binary input string, here starting
with 0110010100, and the snapshot depicts the output relation
T (01) = 0011∗.
An characteristic property of M is its universality:
Theorem 2.5 (Universal enumerable semimeasure [31]).
If T is a monotone Turing machine then MT is an enumerable
semimeasure. Vice versa, for every enumerable semimeasure
m there exists a monotone Turing machine T with MT (x) =
m(x) for all non-empty strings x ∈ S. Moreover, if U is
universal, then MU is a universal enumerable semimeasure;
that is, for every enumerable semimeasure m, it holds
MU (x) ≥ 2−KU (m) ·m(x)
for all x ∈ S, where KU (m) denotes the length of the shortest
binary string that makes U emulate any monotone Turing
machine which has m as its semimeasure, i.e.
KU (m) = min{`(x) | ∀p : U(xp) = T (p) and MT = m}.
This definition uses the notion of enumerability of a func-
tion f : S → R. Suppose we have a computable function
Φ : S × N → R such that limn→∞ Φ(x, n) = f(x) and
Φ(x, n) ≤ Φ(x, n + 1) for all x ∈ S and n ∈ N. Then f
can be approximated from below by a single computer pro-
gram (computing Φ), without necessarily knowing how close
the approximation will be to the true value f(x). In this
case f is called enumerable. If additionally (−f) is enumer-
able as well, then we can estimate the error of approximation
for finite n by computably determining a finite interval that
contains f(x). If this is the case, f is called computable.
While M = MU is only a semimeasure, we can define its
Solomonoff normalization [46]
PU (ε) := 1, PU (xa) := PU (x) · MU (xa)∑
b MU (xb)
(a ∈ {0, 1})
to obtain a measure that shares many (but not all) desirable
properties with M. We also define P := PU , where U is our
choice of reference universal computer. It is easy to see that
MU and PU are related by the inequalities
PU (x) ≥MU (x), PU (y|x) ≥MU (y|x).
This P will be our measure of choice, and will be called
“algorithmic probability” in the following. We are now ready
to formulate the basic postulates of the theory of this paper.
3. POSTULATES OF AN INCOMPLETE THEORY
Let me clarify right away that the theory of this paper will
not satisfy all the desirabilities that have been formulated in
the introduction. Namely, what we would like to have is a
theory that satisfies the following Postulates:
Postulates 3.1 (Desired postulates; not used in that form).
(i) Observer states. Having a first-person perspective
means to be in some observer state at any given (sub-
jective) moment. The observer states are in com-
putable one-to-one correspondence with the finite bi-
nary strings.
(ii) Dynamics. Being in some observer state x now, there
is a well-defined chance of being in some other observer
state y next. It is denoted
Pdes(y|x), (3)
and is given by a variant of algorithmic probability —
in more detail, by a countably-infinite set of algorith-
mic priors (one for every universal machine).
(iii) Predictions. The predictions of the theory are those
that are identical for every choice of algorithmic prior.
They follow from (i) and (ii) alone; no external world,
laws of physics or other ingredients are fundamentally
relevant. “Now” and “next” are understood as purely
first-person notions, not related to any external notion
of time or clock.
Before explaining which one of these postulates has to be
modified and why, let me give some more intuition on the
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worldview that they express. The formulation itself seems
solipsistic in some sense: it talks about what it means to
“have a first-person perspective”. In this sense, it talks about
the “I”: I am currently in some state x, and then I will be in
some other state y. So who is this “I”? What about “you”
or “them”, i.e. other observers? Or is there only ever one
observer?
We will address these questions in more detail in the fol-
lowing sections, when the ontology of the theory will become
gradually more clear while working out the postulates’ con-
sequences. A preliminary answer is that the postulates can
be used by everybody : they allow every observer in principle
to make an educated guess of what happens to them next,
if they hold some knowledge5 of their current observer state
x. This is a bit similar to the tenets of Bayesianism, which
can be used by everybody to make rational bets on their fu-
ture. Nonetheless, the probabilities P(y|x) are understood
as actual chances, not as degrees of belief.
In the theory described by these postulates, there is no
fundamental notion of an “observer”, but only of “observer
states”. That is, observers are not material objects in some
universe which could be distinguished and counted, at least
not in all cases. This is perhaps not so surprising, given
that we have a theory that intends to say something mean-
ingful about puzzles like Parfit’s teletransportation paradox
or about “copying” observers. For a colorful example, think
of the “Back to the Future” movie series, in which the main
protagonist (Marty McFly) meets his older self in the future.
Is this now one observer, or two? This is a fundamentally
meaningless question. In any case, our theory will allow sit-
uations that can best be described as “encountering other
observers”, and we will discuss these situations in detail in
Section 5.
So when did the observer start? When did she hold her
first observer state? Will she not die some time? Indeed,
the postulates above say that the answer to the latter ques-
tion is negative — the observer will follow a never-ending
Markovian process. It also doesn’t make sense to talk of
a “beginning”. Any notions of this kind — and of an ex-
ternal world that seems to have begun in a Big Bang a long
time ago — will have to be reconstructed from the postulates
alone. The exciting news is that this can in fact be done to
some extent. That is, we will understand “why” observers
will see something like an external world “around them” as
a consequence of these postulates.
Before discussing Postulate (iii) in more detail, let me ex-
plain why, unfortunately, algorithmic probability does not
formalize all the intuitive properties that the desired Pdes
in (3) above should have. Intuitively, if an observer is in
state x, then she can transition into another state y that
may hold more or less information than x. In particular, it
is possible for observers to “forget” information: sometimes,
memory is erased, and our next observer state y does not
contain full information on the previous state x. This seems
natural and unavoidable. On the other hand, conditional
algorithmic probability P(y|x) = P(xy)/P(x) is defined as
5 Note that this knowledge is typically not complete: it is hard for an
observer to hold a complete description of itself. It even seems like a
kind of Go¨delian impossibility in principle.
the probability that the next observer state will be xy, given
that it is now x. In other words, algorithmic probability
defines a situation in which an observer never forgets any-
thing. This will define the postulates that we are actually
working with — and, as expressed below, it will therefore
be an approximation to our desired postulates which applies
whenever memory erasure can be neglected:
Postulates 3.2 (Deficient postulates as actually used).
(i) Observer states. Having a first-person perspective
means to be in some observer state at any given (sub-
jective) moment. The observer states are in com-
putable one-to-one correspondence with the finite bi-
nary strings.
(ii) Dynamics. Being in some observer state x now, there
is a well-defined chance of being in some other observer
state xa next, where a ∈ {0, 1} is a bit. It is given by
PU (a|x), (4)
i.e. the conditional version of algorithmic probability
P as defined after Theorem 2.5. Here, U is a universal
monotone Turing machine that can be chosen arbitrar-
ily, but has to be fixed.
(iii) Predictions. The predictions of the theory are those
that are identical for every choice of universal machine
U . They follow from (i) and (ii) alone; no external
world, laws of physics or other ingredients are funda-
mentally relevant. “Now” and “next” are understood
as purely first-person notions, not related to any exter-
nal notion of time or clock.
Interpretation: These postulates will make similar predic-
tions as the “desired theory” (expressed in Postulates 3.1) in
those cases where the observer holds a large amount of mem-
ory on her previous states; they will fail to do so, however,
when forgetting (information erasure) becomes relevant.
It is no loss of generality to assume that observers learn a
bit at a time: learning more than one bit can be expressed
via the chain rule. If y = y1y2 . . . ym ∈ {0, 1}m, then
P(y|x) = P(y1|x)P(y2|xy1) . . .P(ym|xy1 . . . ym−1).
It is not clear how a transition probability Pdes as in (3)
that admits forgetting should be defined; we will speculate in
Section 8 that an attempt to define it should probably come
with a different choice of set of observer states, containing
more structure than the set of binary strings.
Nevertheless, my hope is that even this “deficient” set of
postulates allows us to get a glimpse on the typical properties
of theories of the kind as envisaged in this paper. Indeed,
even in this simplified form, we will see that there is a wealth
of surprising insights and consistent predictions that we can
extract. We will therefore work with Postulates 3.2, but
always keep in mind that forgetting, i.e. memory erasure, is
not consistently treated by these postulates.
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3.1. Algorithmic priors and levels of indeterminism
Let us now turn to Postulate (iii), which is closely related
to the following question: which universal machine U should
we use in (4)? At first sight, it seems as if the infinitude of
universal monotone Turing machines U , and the correspond-
ing infinitude of algorithmic probabilities PU , would make
the theory underdetermined. Is there a “correct” choice of
U? Or can we somehow average over all PU in a clever
way to fix the probabilities? Unfortunately, it can be shown
that the answer to this question must be “no” as a matter
of principle [49–51, 64], which can be related to well-known
insights from philosophy like “Goodman’s new riddle of in-
duction” [62].
Instead, Postulate (iii) says that it is arbitrary which U
to choose — the predictions of the theory are exactly those
that are the same for every U . In fact, as we shall see,
there are many interesting predictions that are identical for
all PU . This is due to the invariance property: if U and
V are universal monotone Turing machines, then there are
constants 0 < c < C such that
cPV (x) ≤ PU (x) ≤ C PV (x) for all x ∈ S.
But shouldn’t there be an actual probability P(a|x) of the
next bit a, given the current observer state x? How can
we have any predictive power whatsoever if we can make
PU (a|x) equal to basically any real number between zero and
one? First of all, note that while one is allowed to choose an
arbitrary U , one is also obliged to keep it fixed. That is, U
is not allowed to be changed after learning a new bit a, so
we cannot simply make our probabilistic predictions attain
arbitrary desired numerical values, independently over time.
To better understand the meaning of Postulate (iii), let
me argue by analogy. Imagine a physicist (the Conservative)
who is familiar with Newtonian mechanics (and perhaps its
relativistic version), but nothing else. Newtonian mechan-
ics is a fully deterministic theory — exact knowledge of the
initial conditions allows us to predict the future behavior of
any physical system exactly. Let us denote this property
by “level-0 indeterminism”. That is, Newtonian mechanics,
as a physical theory, is level-0 indeterministic (namely, de-
terministic). If our world was actually exactly governed by
Newtonian mechanics, then we would live in a level-0 inde-
terministic world.
Now suppose that the Conservative is shocked to meet an-
other physicist (the Liberal) who has just proposed a physi-
cal theory which is irreducibly probabilistic: quantum theory.
As the Liberal proposes, quantum theory does not allow us
to predict the outcomes of experiments with certainty, but
instead tells us the probabilities of the outcomes. For ex-
ample, if we send a single photon to a half-silvered mirror,
then there is a 50% chance of detecting the transmitted ver-
sus the reflected photon. In other words: the Liberal claims
that quantum theory is level-1 indeterministic. This leads to
the following conversation.
Conservative: “Of course, every good physical theory
should tell us what the particles are going to do, and not
just give us probabilities! Doesn’t this just mean that you
don’t know exactly all the details of your mirror? That you
just have to look at it more closely, and then you can actually
predict whether the photon will be reflected or transmitted?”
Liberal: “No. If my theory is correct, then it is in prin-
ciple impossible to predict this — the process is intrinsically
random. In other words, I claim that nature simply does
not carry enough structure to determine the outcome of the
experiment. This should not come as a surprise: for exam-
ple, you have already learnt from relativity that the notion
of simultaneity is, surprisingly, not part of the furniture of
the world, even though it intuitively should be. I claim that
quantum theory tells us that determination of measurement
results is yet another piece of furniture that has to go.”
Conservative: “But what exactly is the content of the
claim that the transmission probability is 50%? When I re-
peat the experiment ten times, does this tell me that the
photon will be transmitted five times? You explained to me
that it does not. It could be six times, or actually all ten
times. Nothing is excluded and nothing predicted.”
Liberal: “Well, if you repeat the experiment many times
(say, n times), then the law of large numbers tells you that
there is a high probability that the fraction of times m it was
transmitted (that is, m/n) is ε-close to 1/2.”
Conservative: “... there is a high probability of that hap-
pening... You just explained the meaning of 50% probability
to me by resorting to yet another mention of probability.
This is circular reasoning! I’m still waiting for your explana-
tion of what a probabilistic claim actually means.”
Liberal: “Yes, this reasoning is circular — the notion
of probability cannot ultimately be grounded in any deter-
ministic notion. Nevertheless, probabilistic claims are not
meaningless. They resemble structure of the world — though
weaker structure than determinism — that allows us to place
successful bets. We have learned by experience how to use
probabilities to act rationally in the face of indeterminism.
This is an empirical fact that’s hard to deny.”
Half convinced, the conservative leaves and downloads a
copy of the Liberal’s lecture notes. In the meantime, the
Liberal meets yet another physicist (the Gambler) who has
just proposed Postulates 3.2. These postulates describe a
level-2 indeterministic theory : that is, one in which there
is not a single probability distribution, but an infinite set
of possible distributions that are supposed to describe the
chances. The Liberal is shocked.
Liberal: “Of course, every good physical theory should
tell us what the probabilities are, and not just give us an
infinite set of priors! Doesn’t this just mean that you don’t
yet know what the correct distribution is? I guess you have
to work a bit harder, until you can improve the postulates
to tell us the actual values of the probabilities!”
Gambler: “No. If my theory is correct, then it is in
principle impossible to say this — nature simply does not
carry enough structure to determine the actual numerical
values of probabilities. You must be well aware that we had
to let go of other beloved furniture of the world before.”
Liberal: “But what exactly is the content of the claim that
observer states are described by the infinite set of algorithmic
priors PU? Does this mean that when I pick my favorite
universal machine U , my future states will be distributed
according to PU? You explained to me that it does not.”
Gambler: “Well, it tells you that if there is a computable
regularity that you have observed often enough, then for ev-
ery PU there will ultimately be a high probability that this
regularity remains. This is the nature of algorithmic proba-
bility, or universal induction.”
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Liberal: “... for every PU it will ultimately... But for
some PU it will happen faster than for others. So, suppose I
have seen a regularity n times, then what is the actual prob-
ability that this regularity will remain? I’m still waiting for
your concrete explanation of what the set of PU is supposed
to mean.”
Gambler: “The notion of level-2 indeterminism cannot
ultimately be grounded in any level-1 notion. Nevertheless,
level-2 claims are not meaningless. They resemble structure
of the world — though weaker structure than level-1 — that
allows us to place rational bets. In fact, I claim that this is
how we actually bet in this world anyway : we can start with
an arbitrary prior, and use new data to update it. When you
say that there is a 50% chance that a photon will be reflected
or transmitted, you are basing this claim on a strong belief
that this is really a half-silvered mirror, and that repetitions
of the experiment can be treated as exchangeable. But these
are also only statements with certain probabilities attached
to them (even if you think that these probabilities are close
to one), and so on, ad infinitum. The best a physical theory
can do is to tell us which kinds of priors are admissible, and
which ones are not (for example, ones with a belief in the
violation of conservation laws).”
Convinced by some amount that is hard to quantify (per-
haps half convinced, perhaps 30%), the Liberal leaves... and
starts to feel really old.
The position of the Gambler resembles some arguments
that are also often heard in another camp: by supporters
of QBism [7, 86, 87], i.e. of (subjective) Quantum Bayesian-
ism (or nowadays called “Quantum Betabiliterianism” by its
founders). QBists argue that the actual numerical values of
probabilities (or, for that matter, the concrete entries of a
quantum density matrix) are not themselves properties of
the world, but represent subjective beliefs. As the argument
goes, it is instead the update rules (e.g. the Born rule) and
the structure of the state space (e.g. the Hilbert space dimen-
sion) that resemble actual “facts of the world”. In this sense,
QBists would perhaps agree that “quantum states represent
beliefs which are level-2”, whereas Postulates 3.2 should be
understood as saying that “objective chances are level-2”.
The idea of a set of priors is not new. It has been studied
in many different forms under the name of imprecise probabil-
ity [52], and it appears in physics under the name of equiv-
alence of ensembles [53–55]. That is, in many situations,
thermodynamics is understood as a theory with predictions
that agree for the canonical and microcanonical ensembles,
and it is in some sense arbitrary which ensemble to select.
There is another important advantage of postulating a set
of priors over picking a single distribution: it allows for a
strong notion of encoding invariance.
3.2. Encoding invariance
What do the bits in an observer state x actually mean?
Postulates 3.2 tells us that the length `(x) says how many
state transition the observer has suffered since its state of no
information. Moreover, the order of bits is relevant as well:
if x = x1x2 . . . xn, then the first bit is the one that has been
acquired first, the second bit came after this, and so on.
But what about the meaning of “zero” versus “one”? Isn’t
it naive to claim that an observer’s first-person perspective
is described by a bunch of bits in the first place? This con-
ceptual confusion can be clarified by taking a more abstract
point of view. According to this view, observer states them-
selves are not binary strings, but they can be encoded into
binary strings. Think of an unspecified countably-infinite set
O of observer states, and a bijective map α : O → S that
tells us which observer state is represented by which binary
string. We assume that observer states have additional struc-
ture: there is a distinguished empty observer state oε, and for
every observer state o, there are two different distinguished
observer states o′ and o′′ that we can think of as “continu-
ations” of o, encoding an additional answer to some yes-no-
question. Then α should be structure-preserving: it should
satisfy α(oε) = ε and `(α(o
′)) = `(α(o′′)) = `(α(o)) + 1.
Consider another bijective structure-preserving encoding
map β : O → S. The two maps α and β encode any o ∈ O
into different binary strings, xα := α(o) and xβ := β(o).
Consequently, xβ = β ◦ α−1(xα). We can think of the bijec-
tive map β ◦ α−1 : S → S as an encoding transformation: it
preserves the length and prefix properties of any string, but
switches between two different possible encodings of observer
states.
We need one additional piece of structure on the observer
states: a computability structure. Intuitively, we would like
to say that both α and β should be computable. However, we
have no idea what this means. But whatever it does mean,
it should imply that the composition β ◦ α−1 is computable
too — and, as a map on the binary strings, computability of
this function is a well-defined notion. This argumentation
leads us to the following definition and theorem:
Theorem 3.3 (Encoding invariance). Let ϕ : S → S be
any structure-preserving map on the observer states, i.e. a
computable bijective map whose inverse is computable, and
which preserves prefixes in the sense that ϕ(ε) = ε and
ϕ({x0, x1}) = {ϕ(x)0, ϕ(x)1}.
Then the theory expressed by Postulates 3.2 is invariant un-
der every such map; that is,
{PU | U universal} = {PU ◦ ϕ | U universal},
i.e. the set of algorithmic priors is invariant under structure-
preserving maps. As explained above, we can interpret this
as a “freedom of choice of encoding” of observer states into
binary strings.
An example of a structure-preserving map is given by the
bitwise inversion: for example, ϕ(1011) = 0100. This theo-
rem tells us that the predictions of our theory do not change
if we decide to switch zeros with ones in the representation
of observer states.
Proof. Note that PU ◦ϕ = Pϕ−1◦U , i.e. the distribution PU ◦
ϕ can be obtained as the one coming from a machine that
works like U , but applies ϕ−1 to its outputs. Since ϕ is
structure-preserving if and only if ϕ−1 is, it only remains to
show that
{ϕ−1 ◦ U | U universal} ⊆ {U | U universal}.
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In other words, we have to show that V := ϕ−1 ◦ U is uni-
versal whenever U is universal. To see this, let T be any
monotone Turing machine, hence ϕ ◦ T is a monotone Tur-
ing machine. Since U is universal, there is some x ∈ S such
that U(xp) = ϕ◦T (p) for all p, and so V (xp) = ϕ−1◦U(xp) =
T (p) for all p. This proves that V is universal.
There is an intuitive analogy of these insights with differ-
ential geometry as used, for example, in the theory of general
relativity: the set O is analogous to the manifold of space-
time points, and the maps α and β correspond to two dif-
ferent coordinate systems. These coordinate systems should
preserve the differentiability structure of the manifold, and
the physical laws are invariant under changes of coordinates.
Here, the structure to be preserved is the observer states’
computability structure (together with the prefix structure),
and our theory is invariant under changes of encoding.
Now that we have seen that a set of priors is the way to
proceed, we still have to discuss why this set should be cho-
sen as the set of algorithmic priors. In Section 2, we have
given an intuitive motivation for selecting algorithmic prob-
ability: it is in some sense a “natural probability structure”,
derived from the structure of mathematics alone, without the
need for any further choices. The next subsection will give a
second, independent argument.
3.3. Why use algorithmic probability?
Our choice of algorithmic probability can also be under-
stood in a pragmatic way, namely as the result of extrapo-
lating a successful method of prediction to a larger and more
general domain: Solomonoff induction [31, 46].
In a nutshell, Solomonoff induction is a simple prescrip-
tion for predicting future data, given previous data. Sup-
pose that a random process generates one bit x1, x2, . . . after
the other, according to an unknown and perhaps very com-
plicated measure µ. Think of a scientist who receives these
bits, and is supposed to predict the probability of the next
bit, µ(a|x1 . . . xn). There is one extra promise that may help
the scientist to place her guess: that µ is computable. That
is, there exists a (potentially extremely inefficient) algorithm
that, on input x = x1 . . . xn and n ∈ N, outputs an n-digit
approximation of µ(x). Needless to say, neither µ nor this
algorithm are known to the scientist.
Solomonoff induction is the following prescription: as a
good guess for µ(a|x), use algorithmic probability P(a|x).
That is all. As we will study in more detail in Section 4.4,
this guess P is guaranteed to be close to the actual proba-
bility µ in the limit of n→∞.
Solomonoff induction works in the context of computable,
probabilistic processes — and there is one particularly rele-
vant process of this kind: our physical world, as it presents
itself to the observations of a physicist. Given data on ini-
tial conditions of some physical system, we can in principle
write a computer program that simulates the laws of physics
as we know them and produces predictions for all observa-
tions that we may perform on the system at later times.
While these predictions will in general be probabilistic (as
dictated by quantum theory), the statistical inferences that
we draw from them are in great agreement with our actual
observations. It is a remarkable empirical finding that the
notion of “universal computation”, based on the Turing ma-
chine [34, 35], seems to capture every kind of process in our
universe that can be subjected to this kind of controlled em-
pirical analysis6.
This observation and its extrapolation to all physical ex-
periments that we may perform in the future — sometimes
called the “physical version” of the Church-Turing thesis7 —
is supported by experience and a variety of arguments. All
theoretical attempts to construct reasonable mathematical
models of computation, especially under the constraint to be
realizable in our physical world, have so far turned out to
be equivalent to the Turing machine model. This includes
quantum computers, which can compute exactly the same
class of functions as classical ones (the fact that they may be
superpolynomially faster at some tasks [18] does not inval-
idate the formulation of the thesis that we are considering
here since we may ignore questions of efficiency). Despite
some claims in the opposite, no physical system performing
“hypercomputation” has ever been identified [41].
This implies a very simple and at the same time surprising
consequence: Solomonoff induction can be used to make suc-
cessful predictions in our physical world — predictions that
must agree with those of our best physical theories (or even
better future theories) if their regime of applicability is the
regime of data collection. Solomonoff induction will auto-
matically “discover” the probabilistic laws of nature that we
already have (such as quantum theory), or possible future
ones. In some sense, Solomonoff induction can thus be seen
as a formal analogue of the scientific method itself.
One of the major motivations of this paper is the insight
that there are regimes of experience that we are currently
entering which go beyond the standard domain of physics,
cf. Table 1: for example, we are interested in the experience
of observers in extremely large universes (cosmology and the
Boltzmann brain problem), or we would like to understand
what an agent is going to see if her brain is simulated on a
computer (philosophy of mind). The problem is that physics
as we currently know it is not designed to address these ques-
tions, at least not directly, as heralded by the controversial
discussions that characterize these fields. It is at this point
where the insight above is quite suggestive: Solomonoff in-
duction agrees perfectly with our best physical theories in the
usual regime of physics, but it can also be applied in more
exotic domains. But then, there is an obvious approach that
we can take: Go ahead and apply Solomonoff induction to
these new regimes of experience!
Applying Solomonoff induction means nothing but pre-
dicting the future according to conditional algorithmic prob-
6 This is a statement of principle and not of practice. For all practical
purposes, it may e.g. remain forever impossible to produce an accu-
rate simulate of the statistics of all of planet Earth in any detail (as
described by quantum theory or any future theory), even though the
physical Church-Turing thesis claims that a corresponding (extremely
inefficient) algorithm exists in principle.
7 While the original Church-Turing thesis does not directly relate to
physics, several different versions of this thesis have been formulated
over the decades. The version that we refer to here resembles, for
example, Wolfram’s [36] “principle of computational equivalence”. It
has been analyzed in more detail by Gandy [37], who calls (something
very similar to) it “Thesis M”, and in the quantum context by Arrighi
and Dowek [38]. For an overview and discussion of different versions
of the Church-Turing thesis, see e.g. [39, 40].
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ability. But this is exactly what Postulates 3.2 are claiming:
namely, that the chances of our future observations are given
by conditional algorithmic probability. In this sense, our pos-
tulates can be seen as simply formalizing the prescription
that we have derived above — namely, to apply Solomonoff
induction in all situations in which we may ask “what will I
see next?”8.
In the rest of the paper, we are indeed going to do exactly
that. For example, we will apply Solomonoff induction to ex-
orcise Boltzmann brains in Subsection 6.1, and we will derive
predictions on the computer simulation of agents in Subsec-
tion 6.2. By doing so, we will work with Postulates 3.2, but
will sometimes speculate what would happen if we instead
had a better theory that realizes Postulates 3.1.
The description above may render Solomonoff induction
almost “magical”, showing that it is somehow automatically
consistent with our best physical theories. But all that the
above really says, at least up to this point, is that agents
who have made observations in agreement with our physical
theories in the past should bet on the validity of those theories
in the future. This is simply a manifestation of universal
induction. Clearly, our theory should say more than that to
be considered successful: it should explain why these past
observations, indicating the presence of simple computable
laws within an external world with certain properties, are to
be expected in the first place. This is what we are going to
address next.
4. EMERGENCE OF AN EXTERNAL PHYSICAL
WORLD
“The only thing harder to understand than a law of
statistical origin would be a law that is not of statistical
origin, for then there would be no way for it [...] to come
into being. On the other hand, when we view each of the
laws of physics [...] as at bottom statistical in character,
then we are at last able to forego the idea of a law that
endures from everlasting to everlasting.” (John A. Wheeler,
“Law Without Law” [33]).
Now we are ready to prove the first consequence of our
postulates: that observers will, with high probability, see
an external world that is governed by simple, computable,
probabilistic laws (that is, laws that assign probabilities to
observations and which have a short description), but the
form of these laws will itself be contingent. Before showing
this in full generality, let us start with a first “warm-up” that
gives us some intuition as to why and how regularities may
emerge and stabilize themselves.
8 In more detail, the prescription is not to actually use Solomonoff
induction to predict the future, because we cannot know all details of
our observer states (and we cannot compute algorithmic probability).
It is rather the idea that we should think of algorithmic probability
as dictating what happens in these new regimes of experience, and
then do our best to extract concrete predictions from this claim.
4.1. Warm-up: persistence of regularities
Suppose that an observer is currently in observer state x.
Then, her state will subsequently change to a longer strong
xy, with probability
P(y|x) ≥M(y|x) = M(xy)
M(x)
≥ 2
−Km(xy)
M(x)
.
This inequality tells us that transitions to those xy tend
to be preferred which are “more natural continuations” of
the previous state x. That is, if xy has a short descrip-
tion, i.e. if Km(xy) is small, then the corresponding xy tends
to occur with higher probability than other possible states
xy′. Thus, simplicity in the sense of compressibility is fa-
vored. Intuitively, highly compressible histories (or strings)
are those that contain regularities which can be used to gen-
erate shorter descriptions.
How can we define the notion of “regularities” and prove
that they are somehow favored by algorithmic probability P?
It turns out that an abstract approach is the most simple and
powerful one: namely, defining a “regularity” of an observer
state x as some property for which a computer program can
check in finite time whether or not it is present:
Definition 4.1 (Computable tests). A computable function
f : S → {0, 1} is called a computable test. A computable
test is called sustainable if f(ε) = 1 and if for all x ∈ S with
f(x) = 1 there is some bit a ∈ {0, 1} with f(xa) = 1.
In a nutshell, a computable test is sustainable if whenever
it gives the answer “yes”, it can possibly still give the answer
“yes” in the next moment.
Imagine an observer in state x = x1x2 . . . xn (where the xi
are the bits), and suppose that there is a computable test f
such that f(x1) = f(x1x2) = . . . = f(x1 . . . xn) = 1. This
describes a regularity: all previous observer states (including,
for example, observations) had the property that the test f
yielded the outcome “yes”. In this case, the observer may be
led to believe that f will yield “yes” in the next moment, too.
The following theorem, inspired by [60], shows that this guess
will asymptotically be correct due to the properties of algo-
rithmic probability. We use the notation xk1 := x1x2 . . . xk if
x = x1 . . . xn and k ≤ n.
Theorem 4.2 (Persistence of regularities). Let f be a sus-
tainable computable test. For bits a1, . . . , an, b ∈ {0, 1}, de-
fine the measure p as
p(b|a1a2 . . . an) := P{f(xn+11 ) = b | f(x11) = a1, . . . ,
f(xn1 ) = an}.
Then we have p(1|1n) n→∞−→ 1, and the convergence is rapid
since
∑∞
n=0 p(0|1n) < ∞. That is, computable regularities
that were holding in the past tend to persist in the future.
Proof. Since f is a sustainable computable test, there is an
algorithm that constructs an infinite string z ∈ {0, 1}∞ with
the property that f(zk1 ) = 1 for all k ∈ N. Namely, the
algorithm starts with the empty string, and then picks some
bit z1 such that f(z1) = 1, and then picks some next bit z2
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such that f(z1z2) = 1, and so forth. Define
p(a1a2 . . . an) :=
∑
x∈{0,1}n:f(x1)=a1,...,f(xn)=an
P(x),
which yields a measure in the sense of Definition 2.2. Its
conditional version p(b|a) is the quantity we are interested
in. Let µ be the computable measure with µ(x) = 1 if x
is a prefix of z, and 0 otherwise. Since M is a universal
enumerable semimeasure, there is some constant c > 0 such
that M(x) ≥ c µ(x) for all x ∈ S, thus
p(1n) ≥ P(zn1 ) ≥M(zn1 ) ≥ c µ(zn1 ) = c for all n ∈ N.
On the other hand, p(1n) =
∏n−1
j=0 p(1|1j), hence
log c ≤
n−1∑
j=0
log p(1|1j) ≤
n−1∑
j=0
(
p(1|1j)− 1) .
Since this is true for all n, the claim follows.
As a simple example, consider the “frequency of ones” of
some string x, defined as #1(x)/`(x), where #1(x) is the
number of ones in x (for example, #1(1011) = 3). Let us
define a computable test f that asks whether the frequency of
ones is larger than 90%. This is only an interesting question
for longer strings. For all x ∈ S with `(x) ≥ 10, set
f(x) :=
{
1 if #1(x)/`(x) ≥ 0.9
0 otherwise.
and for strings x ∈ S with `(x) ≤ 9, set f(x) := 1 if and only
if x is a prefix of any string y of length 10 with f(y) = 1.
For example, f(1101111111) = 1, hence f(110) = 1 and
f(ε) = 1.
This is a computable test, but is it sustainable? Suppose
that f(x) = 1 and `(x) ≤ 9, then there exists some a ∈ {0, 1}
with f(xa) = 1 by construction. If `(x) ≥ 10, the
#1(x1)
`(x1)
=
#1(x) + 1
`(x) + 1
≥ #1(x)
`(x)
≥ 0.9,
hence f is indeed sustainable. Thus, Theorem 4.2 that an
observer that has been in states with more than 90% of ones
for long enough will probably continue to be in states with
this property in the future.
However, a moment’s thought shows that Theorem 4.2
doesn’t really say very much: facts can change, and the an-
swers to yes-no-questions can flip over time. This simple
observation creates a puzzle of relevance far beyond this pa-
per, which is known under the name of “Goodman’s new
riddle of induction” [62]. To illustrate this, consider another
sustainable computable test f which simply asks whether
the observer state’s last bit equals one. Fix some very large
number N ∈ N (say, one with large Kolmogorov complexity
K(N) 1), and define a modified test f ′ by
f ′(x) :=
{
f(x) if `(x) ≤ N,
1− f(x) if `(x) > N.
The computable test f seems as simple or “natural” as prop-
erties like “green” or “blue”, whereas f ′ resembles Good-
man’s properties “grue” or “bleen”: “Is the observer young
and her last bit equals one, or is she old and her last bit
equals zero?” Now if our observer has seen that f(x1) =
. . . = f(x1x2 . . . xn) = 1, but n ≤ N , then Theorem 4.2 ap-
plies to both f and f ′. So what should the observer bet on
— that the last bit switches at some point?
This puzzle is resolved by noting that Theorem 4.2 gives
only an asymptotic statement: it only says that if n is large
enough, then f (resp. f ′) will yield the answer “yes“ (i.e. 1)
with high probability in the future, if it did in the past. In-
tuitively, what happens is that the regularity f = 1 stabilizes
itself much faster than the regularity f ′ = 1. In particular, if
n = N , then we expect that f(x1x2 . . . xn+1) = 1 has higher
probability than f ′(x1x2 . . . xn+1) = 1, since f is a simpler
computable test, and thus the corresponding regularity state-
ment is preferred by algorithmic probability. Intuitively, the
regularity f ′ would stabilize itself only after n  N and
if the observer has in fact seen her last bit switch. In the
notation of the proof of Theorem 4.2, we have
− log c = K(µ) +O(1) ≤ K(f) +O(1),
which means that
∑∞
n=0 p(0|1n) (a measure of the “total ex-
ceptions from the rule”) tends to be smaller if f has a shorter
description length.
This simple example teaches us two things. First, we
should not only look at regularities, but also at their com-
plexities — simple regularities will be more relevant. Second,
instead of answering a single yes-no-question, we should try
to answer a multitude of questions as parts of some “web of
knowledge”. We would like to show that the regularities fit
together to give the observer a coherent notion of a “world”.
This is what we are going to address next.
4.2. Computable laws and the external process
Having studied a (rather weak) notion of “persistence
of regularities” in the previous subsection, it is clear that
physics as we know it has much more to offer. For example,
regularities in physics are often at the level of the statistics
rather than in the actual results. In particular in the con-
text of quantum theory, when we talk about “simple laws of
physics”, we have simplicity in a peculiar form: the proba-
bilistic laws themselves seem to be simple, but the individual
measurement outcomes turn out to be complex.
As an example9, consider a single quantum spin- 12 -particle
(a qubit) and the following experimental setup: the spin is
first measured in Z-direction, then in X-direction, then in Z-
direction again and so on — that is, Z- and X-directions are
alternately measured on the single qubit; in total, there are
n measurements. Assume for the sake of the argument that
the particle starts in a quantum state where the spin points
exactly in X-direction. Whenever the result is “spin-up”, it
will be denoted by a one, and “spin-down” will be denoted
9 This is a rather naive example to illustrate the main idea, not a
profound statement about the foundations of quantum mechanics.
To study the exact nature of randomness in quantum mechanics, one
would have to dive into the subject of interpretations, and also into
the field of device-independent randomness amplification [56].
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by a zero. The result of the measurement is a binary string,
consisting of n bits which encode the measurement outcomes.
Denote the eigenstates in Z-direction by |0〉 and |1〉, and
those in X-direction by |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and |−〉 =
(|0〉−|1〉)/√2. The particle starts in state |+〉. Thus, the first
measurement (which is in Z-direction) will yield outcome
“spin-up” or “spin-down” with probability 12 each. After
that measurement, by the projection postulate, the state of
the system will be either |0〉 or |1〉. But then, the following
measurement in X-direction will again yield spin up or down
with probability 12 each, and so on. According to elementary
quantum mechanics, the resulting string will be completely
random (and there are good arguments that this randomness
is irreducible and not just “apparent” in some sense [56, 57]).
In the end, the situation is equivalent to n tosses of a
fair coin: the n bit values are independently and identically
distributed. But a string x ∈ S that is generated by such a
process is incompressible with high probability [58, 59], i.e.
its monotone complexity Km is close to maximal, such that
Km(x) ≈ n = `(x).
In this example, the rules of quantum mechanics (which
yield the outcome probabilities) are very simple, but the out-
comes themselves are arbitrarily complex. This is a typical
situation in physics. In what follows we will show that this
kind of behavior is predicted by the theory of this paper.
Our main technical tool will be the formulation of
Solomonoff induction [31, 46] as the following theorem [46,
Corollary 5.2.1]. It rests on a slightly different interpretation
of measures µ as defined in Definition 2.2: namely, as proba-
bility measures in the set of infinite strings {0, 1}∞. The idea
is that a statement like µ(101) = 14 should be understood as
saying that the set of all infinite strings that start with 101
has measure 14 . Such sets are called cylinder sets and de-
note, as in this example, [101]. Then, as subsets of {0, 1}∞,
we have for example the disjoint union [10] = [100] ∪ [101],
and consequently µ(10) = µ(100) + µ(101). Formally, the
cylinder sets generate a σ-algebra on {0, 1}∞ on which µ is
a probability measure. The measure-theoretic details can be
found in [46].
Lemma 4.3 (Solomonoff induction). Let µ be a computable
measure. Then there is a set S ⊆ {0, 1}∞ of µ-measure one,
such that for every x ∈ S and every b ∈ {0, 1}
M(b|xn1 ) n→∞−→ µ(b|xn1 ).
Moreover, for all x ∈ S, we have asymptotic normalization:∑
b∈{0,1}
M(b|xn1 ) n→∞−→ 1.
The arrow is to indicate that the difference between left-
and right-hand side turns to zero, not that both sides con-
verge individually. In this equation, x = x1x2x3 . . . is an in-
finite binary string, and xn1 = x1x2 . . . xn denotes the string
of length n that consists of the first n bits of x.
What does this mean? Consider a physicist who observes
a certain random process which emits random bits x1, x2, . . ..
Suppose that the physicist has no idea what random process
it is; all she knows is that there is some underlying proba-
bility measure µ that describes the process accurately, and
that µ is computable. Despite her ignorance, she would like
to predict the probability of future outcome bits.
This situation is in principle close to what scientists are
doing when they try to uncover the hidden mechanisms of
nature; it is a simple model of science. The lemma above
now says that in the long run, i.e. for large n, the physicist
may simply use the universal semimeasure M (or, equiva-
lently, the measure P) to predict the probability of the next
outcomes. This is Solomonoff induction: algorithmic proba-
bility is used as a tool for prediction.
A simple example is given in [46, 60]: suppose that the
unknown process is actually deterministic and emits only
1’s, that is, µ(1n) = 1 for all n ∈ N, where 1n = 111 . . . 1
is the string of length n consisting only of 1’s. Then the
probability that Solomonoff induction predicts a 0 as the
next bit is asymptotically M(0|1n) = 2−K(n)+O(1), which is
of the order 1/n for most n. In particular, this converges to
the “correct” probability zero for large n.
This formulation of Solomonoff induction will have several
applications in the following. As our first application, we
will see that it can give us a surprising prediction: that our
theory implies the emergence of an external world in some
sense. Let us first state the theorem, and then discuss its
interpretation.
Theorem 4.4 (Asymptotic computability).
Let µ be some computable measure. Then,
P
{
P(b|x1 . . . xn) n→∞−→ µ(b|x1 . . . xn)∀b
}
≥ 2−K(µ);
that is, with probability at least 2−K(µ) (which is large if and
only if µ is simple), the actual transition probability P will
in the long run converge10 to the computable measure µ.
That is, in the long run, it happens with probability at
least 2−K(µ) that algorithmic probability converges to the
computable measure µ. This probability is larger for simpler
µ, i.e. for ones that have small Kolmogorov complexity K(µ)
as defined in Definition 2.5.
Proof. Since P is just a normalized version of M, Lemma 4.3
and asymptotic normalization imply that there is a Borel set
S ⊆ S∞ with µ(S) = 1 such that M(b|xn1 ) − µ(b|xn1 ) n→∞−→
10 Regarding the speed of convergence, it seems to be a generic phe-
nomenon that the standard notion of limit (for every δ > 0 there is
some N ∈ N such that the difference is smaller than δ for all n ≥ N)
does not yield the strongest or most relevant notion of convergence in
this context. That is, one would expect that even for “most” n < N ,
the difference is small already. This is a consequence of the irreg-
ular behavior of Kolmogorov complexity, and can be seen nicely in
the example on page 13: we have M(0|1n) = 2−K(n)+O(1). This
expression tends to zero, but does so extremely slowly, since there
are always astronomically large n with exceptionally small complex-
ity K(n). However, it is close to zero (or, in more detail, to 1/n)
for most n, since most n have K(n) ≈ logn. An observer subject to
a random process with transition probabilities M(b|1n) (or of some
other sort where outcomes actually vary) will thus typically not no-
tice the exceptional values of n, and see convergence much faster
than in the formal δ-criterion. This shows that Theorem 4.4 features
a perhaps too strong form of convergence, and it might be more rel-
evant to ask whether µ-typicality of outcomes might be a “persistent
regularity” (in the sense of Theorem 4.2), for example.
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0 for all x ∈ S. On the other hand, let εn(x) :=
1 − ∑b∈{0,1}M(b|xn1 ), then the same lemma shows that
εn(x)
n→∞−→ 0 for all x ∈ S, and
M(b|xn1 ) ≤ P(b|xn1 ) =
M(b|xn1 )
1− εn(x) ,
and so P(b|xn1 ) − µ(b|xn1 ) n→∞−→ 0 for all x ∈ S. But
for every finite string x ∈ S, Theorem 2.5 shows that
P(x) ≥M(x) ≥ 2−K(µ)µ(x). According to elementary mea-
sure theory, this inequality must then also be true for S, i.e.
P(S) ≥ 2−K(µ)µ(S), lower-bounding the probability of the
stated event as claimed11.
While I do not know whether the the event in Theorem 4.4
(i.e. convergence to some computable measure µ) happens
with total probability one, we can interpret it in a way that
suggests that some possibly weaker form should always be
true. Namely, it seems to say that all regularities which per-
sist according to Theorem 4.2 will tend to “fit together” into
a coherent overall lawlike behavior. That is, if the answers
to several computable tests f all remain “yes”, then this
can be interpreted as consequences of a single computable
statistical law (namely µ) which yields µ-typical outcomes.
Since µ-typicality of the sequence of observations is a much
weaker statement than the convergence of probabilities in
Theorem 4.4, it might still hold in all cases even if that
strong convergence does not happen with unit probability.
We leave a more detailed analysis of this to future work.
In the following, we will assume that the event of Theo-
rem 4.4 happens, for some µ. This assumption is also nat-
ural in the context of the “desired” (not yet realized) Pos-
tulates 3.1: if we have a theory that admits processes of
“forgetting”, then the event of Theorem 4.4 describes a sit-
uation in which an observer accumulates more and more in-
formation, and fully remembers all its earlier state. Now,
the idea is that as long as this process continues, there is a
tendency for regularities to stabilize, and for a resulting com-
putable measure µ to determine the asymptotic transitions.
However, if the observer loses most of her memory, then the
process will basically restart, and there is yet another chance
for asymptotic computability described by some measure µ.
If this repeats often enough, then the event of Theorem 4.4
will eventually happen.
We will now argue that Theorem 4.4 predicts that ob-
servers should expect to see two facts which are features of
physics as we know it: first, the fact that there is an simple,
computable, probabilistic external world that evolves in time
(a “universe”), and second, that this external world seems to
have had an absolute beginning in the past (the “Big Bang”).
11 It is tempting to conjecture an alternative proof of Theorem 4.4 in the
following way. Let p ∈ S be a minimal program for µ in the sense of
Theorem 2.5; in particular, `(p) = K(µ). Consider the set of infinite
strings T := {pq | q ∈ {0, 1}∞, q is Martin-Lo¨f random}, and the
corresponding set S of infinite output strings that are generated by
our universal reference machine U if all strings of T are chosen as
inputs. Since almost all infinite strings are Martin-Lo¨f random, we
have µ(S) ≥ 2−`(p) = 2−K(µ), and these output strings should be
“µ-typical” since the strings in T are, and thus satisfy the property
stated in Theorem 4.4. However, Exercise 5.2.8 in [46] shows that
the latter assertion is not quite true. Thus, one needs more refined
arguments to make this proof idea work. See also the result of [61].
Let us start by taking these two features as empirically
confirmed facts about our physical world, and look at the
“informational” consequences of these facts in the context of
algorithmic complexity. A possible analysis (assuming a cer-
tain view on the quantum state that we do not need to share)
has been performed by Tegmark [42] in a paper with the title
“Does the universe in fact contain almost no information?
In this paper, Tegmark argues that the universe’s quantum
state at (or shortly after) the Big Bang has been very simple,
in the sense that it had in principle a very short description.
Furthermore, there seem to be algorithmically simple laws of
nature determining the state’s time evolution. Thus, there
should in principle exist a concise complete description of
the current quantum state of the universe: simply append a
description of the physical laws and a description (in some
coordinate system) of the time that has passed since the Big
Bang to a description of this initial quantum state. From
this, a computationally immensely complex but algorithmi-
cally very simple computer program will be able to extract
the present quantum state of the universe.
If we continue to accept Tegmark’s Everettian view of
quantum mechanics for the sake of the argument, then we
can argue as follows. If, instead of the full quantum state, we
restrict our attention to observations in typical branches of
the wavefunction, then these observations will nevertheless
look very complex, i.e. have large Kolmogorov complexity.
The reason is very similar to, say a classical coin tossing pro-
cess. While the process itself has a very short description, the
actual sequence of outcomes of, say, 109 coin tosses will typi-
cally have very high Kolmogorov complexity (namely, about
109).
We can thus reformulate the two empirical facts about
our universe in informational terms: observers make obser-
vations that are typically complex, but that are nevertheless
described by an algorithmically simple evolution of an ex-
ternal world. This external world has the property that its
evolution will in general only allow probabilistic predictions
of future observations.
Let us now see how these observations can be understood
as consequences of Theorem 4.4. If the event that is de-
scribed in this theorem happens, then the transition proba-
bility P will converge to a simple computable measure µ,
P(b|x1 . . . xn) n→∞−→ µ(b|x1 . . . xn),
where K(µ) is likely small. According to the definition in
Theorem 2.5 this means the following. Denote the universal
reference machine by U . Then there is a short computer
program (a finite binary string) q of length `(q) = K(µ) with
the property that ∑
p:U(qp)=x∗
2−`(p) = µ(x) (5)
for all finite strings x ∈ S. That is, the computer program
q causes the universal machine U to operate in the following
manner:
• after having read the prefix q from its input, the mono-
tone Turing machine enters a particular mode of com-
putation. In this mode, it sequentially reads further
(random) bits from the input tape (the finite sequence
of these bits that have previously been read, at any
given time step, is called p).
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• The machine does (possibly very complex) computa-
tions in its working memory, and
• sometimes produces a new output xi on its output
tape, building up an output string x1x2x3 . . ..
Attaching the weights 2−`(p) to the input strings p can be
interpreted as supplying independent, identically distributed
random bits to the machine U as input. These bits are read
by the machine, and processed in a computation which pro-
duces outputs from time to time. The outputs are distributed
according to µ. The sequence of output bits x1x2x3, . . .
constitutes the observer’s (say, Alice’s) sequence of observer
states, with xn1 = x1 . . . xn her current state. If Alice herself
— or an imaginary bystander — would like to predict her
next state, then there are now two possibilities: first, predict
P(b|x1 . . . xn) directly. But this is certainly hard, given that
algorithmic probability is not computable. Second, predict
µ(b|x1 . . . xn) — which is the probability that the machine
U will generate b as its next output bit, in the course of the
process that we have just described.
But this allows a much more natural way of prediction:
given all you know (as encoded in xn1 ), make a model of the
state of the machine U and of its inner workings. Then, use
that for prediction. Given that the machine implements a
computable stochastic process, unfolding according to a sim-
ple algorithm of short description, this promises to be a much
more plausible endeavor.
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FIG. 2. As explained in the main text, we can abstract from the
concrete monotone Turing machine model. It is irrelevant that
we have used a colorful model with tapes, internal memory etc.
in our definition; all that counts is the resulting abstract notion
of computational process. An observer’s sequence of states corre-
sponds to the outputs of a machine that generates the asymptotic
measure µ. We can obtain the observer’s state by simply reading
off the output from the output tape, which defines a function fA
as sketched on the left-hand side. In the picture of the abstract
computational process, this corresponds to a computable random
variable fA that reads off the output (that is, the current state)
from wherever it appears in that process, with g(t) the complete
state of this process at computational time t. This is the formula-
tion that we will use later in this paper. An observer will regard
this computational process as her “external world”, and fA can
be interpreted as a “locator function”.
Indeed, it is arguably what human observers do to pre-
dict: given the data that we hold (some of which is collected
by our senses), we infer properties of a hypothetical process
(the external world) that is not directly “part of us”, but
that turns out to be correlated to our future observations.
(“According to the signals that my eyes have just sent me,
there seems to be a tiger approaching... I better run...”)
The situation for Alice is similar: her changes of observer
state (her “experience”) is shaped by the fact that she is only
a small part of a “bigger” process, namely the computational
process that would be run if the universal machine U was to
produce µ via the shortest program. If Alice is smart enough,
she may actually discover this, and call this computational
process her “external world”. This process will have some
simple structure since it is governed by a short computer
program.
One should not think too naively about this computation:
this insight does not suggest that Alice should see actual
tapes, binary digital memory or other specific aspects of a
monotone Turing machine’s hardware in her external world.
A computation in the mathematical sense should be regarded
as a process that is abstracted from the underlying machine
model. While we have defined the algorithmic priors PU
(and the corresponding MU ) in terms of universal monotone
Turing machines, these measures can also be characterized
in abstract ways that do not refer to such machines — for
example as (universal) enumerable semimeasures similarly
to Theorem 2.5.
This demonstrates that we would obtain the same theory
(and set of measures) if we started with a very different ma-
chine model — say, a model where computation is not carried
out on tapes, but in a way which more closely resembles a
cellular automaton. The choice of model of computation is
arbitrary and can be exotic, as long as it can in principle be
simulated by a monotone Turing machine, and (in the uni-
versal case) is in principle able to simulate every monotone
Turing machine12. All we need is a notion of sequentiality
in reading the input (in order to define a semimeasure M in
the first place), and a distinguished way to “read off” the
machine’s output during the computation; all else can sim-
ply be regarded as an abstract computational process. This
is explained in more detail in Figure 2, which also shows how
we will use these abstract notions later in this paper.
While Alice should not expect to see binary digits or out-
put tapes directly in her external world, there are some prop-
erties that are common to all computational processes. One
of them is the fact that computations initially start in a
simple state (at least if the computer program has small al-
gorithmic complexity, which is the case here), and tend to
become more and more complex during the computation.
This complexity comes from the unfolding of logical depth
and computational complexity over many time steps, and in
our case also from the random input bits.
Since the computer program has small algorithmic com-
plexity, the computation itself will correspond to a simple
algorithm. In principle, Alice may be able to determine a
description of this algorithm or of some of its properties,
and predict future time evolution according to these “laws
12 In particular, there is no need to postulate that input bits are dis-
tributed independently identically at random, as (5) seems to suggest
at first sight [63].
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of nature”. Likewise, Alice can use her knowledge of these
laws to “calculate backwards”, and to retrodict the process’
past states, given her knowledge about its current state. This
may include internal process times that have been before the
machine has produced any output; in this sense, before what
she might be tempted to call her “birth”.
If she continues extrapolating backwards to retrodict ear-
lier and earlier states of her universe, she will typically find
simpler and more “compact” states, with measures of en-
tropy or algorithmic complexity decreasing — simply be-
cause she is looking at earlier and earlier stages of an un-
folding computation13. At some point, Alice will necessarily
arrive at the state that corresponds to the initial state of the
machine’s computation (right after the machine U has read
the prefix q), where simplicity and compactness are maximal.
She may call this initial state the “Big Bang”, and hypoth-
esize that the world had its beginning in this moment. This
is broadly consistent with our actual physical observations.
We will discuss this further in Subsection 6.1.
Clearly, the description of this computational process is
not unique. The fact that we can describe computations in
many completely different ways (which however give equiv-
alent algorithmic probabilities) must have a counterpart in
Alice’s freedom of choosing among different descriptions of
her external world which make equivalent empirical predic-
tions. But this is a phenomenon which is well-known in many
fields of physics. For example, we can choose different coor-
dinate systems to describe spacetime, or we can prefer to
add unobservable “pilot waves” to our description of quan-
tum mechanics. The nontrivial prediction is that there exists
some simple description in terms of concise laws of small al-
gorithmic complexity, not that this description is unique.
At the same time, our approach claims that this appear-
ance of an external world is ultimately not fundamental: ac-
cording to Postulates 3.2, what actually determines Alice’s
future observations is conditional algorithmic probability. In
particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene
on this “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to pre-
dict her future observations. Nonetheless, this universe will
seem perfectly real to her, since its state is correlated with
her future experiences. If the measure µ that is computed
within her computational universe assigns probability close
to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick,
then the corresponding experience of pain will probably ren-
der all abstract insights into the non-fundamental nature of
that brick irrelevant.
For what follows, it will be useful to formulate our find-
ings within a certain terminology that has first appeared in
the context of the foundations of quantum mechanics: that
of an ontological model [65, 66]. We will be using this no-
tion in a context that differs somewhat from its originally
intended use. The starting point will be to talk about an op-
erational theory [66]. In the context of quantum mechanics,
this would be a theory that describes preparation procedures
(represented, for example, by quantum states) and measure-
ments. In our context, we can regard an observer in some
observer state x as being subject to a preparation procedure
13 For more details on this, in particular on the relation between com-
plexity and entropy, see Subsection 6.1.
which leads to an operational state P(y|x) (y ∈ S). The cor-
responding measurement procedure would be to wait for m
time steps to see what further bits y = y1 . . . ym the observer
actually acquires14. If we adopt this terminology, then the
monotone Turing machine computation becomes an ontolog-
ical model according to the following definition [66]:
“An ontological model is an attempt to offer an explana-
tion of the success of an operational theory by assuming that
there exist physical systems that are the subject of the exper-
iment. These systems are presumed to have attributes re-
gardless of whether they are being subjected to experimental
test, and regardless of what anyone knows about them. [...]
Thus, a specification of which instance of each attribute ap-
plies at a given time we call the ontic state of the system. If
the ontic state is not completely specified after specifying the
preparation procedure, then the additional variables required
to specify it are called hidden variables. We shall denote the
complete set of variables in an ontological model by λ, and
the space of values of λ by Ω.”
In more detail, we arrive at the following observation:
Observation 4.5 (Computational ontological model).
If we regard the conditional probability P(y|x) (as a func-
tion of y) as an operational state preparation in the sense
explained above, then the corresponding state of the compu-
tational process which generates the approximating measure
µ represents an (approximate) ontological model.
This “computational ontological model” has a set of states
Ω that corresponds to the possible configurations of the com-
putational process. Formulating this process in terms of a
monotone Turing machine, preparation of P(y|x) ≈ µ(y|x)
amounts to the preparation of a probability distribution over
the configurations λ ∈ Ω, including, for example, identically
independently distributed bits on the unread part of the in-
put tape. This ontological model is simple (in the sense
that it is expected to have short description length K(µ)),
probabilistic, and it evolves in time in a way that has once
started in a simple initial state (“Big Bang”). Its time evolu-
tion admits “mechanistic” explanations of the observer state
changes (“I’ve seen the light flash because a particle from this
process has been hitting me.”) We can thus interpret it as
an observer’s external world.
Is this “computational ontological model” unique? Even
if we pick the monotone Turing machines as our underlying
machine model, and fix our universal reference machine U ,
there may be more than one program of length K(µ) which
generates µ. If those programs make the machine perform
different computations (which however all lead to an output
string statistics resembling µ), then we have several equally
simple computational ontological models. However, we ex-
pect that there are not too many programs of length K(µ)
that generate µ. What we take as evidence for this conclusion
14 It is usually considered crucial in the context of quantum theory that
there is not only a single measurement, but a “choice of measure-
ments”; this is not relevant here. However, we will make more direct
contact with quantum theory in Section 7. Furthermore, it is of
course not necessary that the observer “waits passively” for her next
states; our theory can certainly accommodate a notion of action, but
it is not a notion of fundamental importance for our purpose.
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is that there is a well-known analogous statement for stan-
dard Kolmogorov complexity, which says that the number
of shortest programs of any object is bounded by a univer-
sal constant, cf. [46, Exercise 4.3.6]. We conjecture that the
mathematical arguments carry over to the complexity K(µ),
in which case it would follow that the number of (simplest)
computational ontological models of any computable mea-
sure µ is bounded by a universal constant.
Arguably, what we call “our universe” is essentially noth-
ing but a (certain type of) ontological model of our observer
state changes, which is useful to us because it helps us predict
future observations, and because it gives us “mechanistic” ex-
planations of what we see. The arguments above might sug-
gest that what we call our “physical universe” corresponds
exactly to this computational ontological model. But as I
will argue in Section 7, if some version of our theory applies
that involves memory loss (Postulates 3.1), then there will
be an extra layer “between us and the world”, hiding some
degrees of freedom, and leading us to an effective description
that displays some features of quantum theory.
This view suggests some sort of effective pancomputation-
alism [67]: our (emergent external) world is in some sense a
computation. Nevertheless, there is not necessarily a naive
correspondence between the structure of our world and the
causal structure of the computational process as it is usu-
ally envisioned. Other proposals of that kind, including
approaches by Zuse [68], Schmidhuber [69], ’t Hooft [70]
and Lloyd [71], assume a direct one-to-one mapping between
modules of the model of computation (such as “gates” or
“tape cells”) and space-time regions. The approach of this
paper suggests that there is typically only a weak correspon-
dence of this form, going beyond the proposals just men-
tioned, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.
5. THE RISE AND FALL OF OBJECTIVE REALITY
“How come ‘one world’ out of many observer-
participants?” (J. A. Wheeler [15]).
In Section 4, we have seen that our approach predicts some
features of physics as we know it: with high probability, ob-
servers see simple probabilistic “laws of nature”, and find
themselves to be part of an external world that they may
call “the universe”. However, there is one further crucial as-
pect of physics that is not apriori true in our theory: namely
that different observers see the same physical world.
In fact, it is not even clear what it means to talk about
“different observers” in our context. Postulates 3.2 only talk
about observer states, not about “observers” as physical ob-
jects of which you could have two or three. In principle, we
could have a single observer — “the mind” — taking a never-
ending random walk on the observer states, with transitions
determined by algorithmic probability. Or could we? What
would this claim even mean? Is it not empirically obvious
that there are other observers out there, not just I ?
We certainly believe that there are other observers because
we encounter things in our world that seem to hold first-
person perspectives, too: other humans, for example. Let us
now discuss and formalize what this means in our framework.
Suppose that an observer — say, Alice the guinea pig — finds
herself located in some simple, computable, probabilistic ex-
ternal world (characterized by a computable measure µ on
her observer states), as derived in detail in Section 4.
Suppose that Alice encounters another guinea pig, called
Bob3rd, in her external world. The subscript indicates that
this describes a “third-person perspective”: Alice points to
something (an object, a pattern) in her world that she calls
“Bob”. Moreover, Alice can in principle consider the infor-
mation that is stored and processed in Bob3rd’s brain, and
reason about how this information changes in time. Even if
it may be impossible for Alice (or unethical) to open Bob3rd’s
brain and read out all this information in practice, Alice can
still argue that it contains some information that changes
over time, in accordance with the evolution of Alice’s world.
If this evolution is probabilistic, then there will be an induced
probability distribution P3rd that describes the distribution
of Bob3rd’s brain states one moment after the other.
But now, if this momentary information content corre-
sponds to a finite binary string x, then our theory enables us
to regard this string as an observer state. In other words, we
can think of the corresponding first-person perspective that
describes “what it is like” to be in state x, and think of a
corresponding abstract observer Bob1st — the actual “mode
of being” in this state15.
Typically, Alice will expect that Bob3rd and Bob1st are
in some sense “identical”. For example, when she observes
Bob3rd expressing a feeling of happiness on seeing Alice (to-
gether with the corresponding neural correlates), she will as-
sume that Bob1st really does have that feeling in some sense.
But is this really true? Given that our theory admits that
Bob3rd and Bob1st are in some sense different things, is such
an identification possible and meaningful?
We certainly cannot formally analyze what it means to
“feel” something, but the question just asked has an obvious
formal counterpart: namely, we can compare two probabil-
ity measures. On the one hand, we have P3rd, the probabil-
ity induced by Alice’s world on Bob3rd’s fate; on the other
hand, we have algorithmic probability, P1st := P that de-
termines Bob1st’s actual first-person chances according to
Postulates 3.2. Is there any relation between the two?
To put these considerations into a more concrete form,
consider the question whether the sun rises tomorrow. Sup-
pose that Alice has gathered enough information about her
external world, and about the physical measure µ, to know
that there is a probability close to one that the sun is go-
ing to rise tomorrow. Thus, Alice will have a close to 100%
chance of seeing Bob3rd see the sun rise tomorrow. But what
is Bob1st’s actual chance to see the sun rise tomorrow, from
his first-person perspective?
5.1. Asymptotic coherence of P1st and P3rd
Let us go into a bit more formal detail. As in Figure 2,
we have some computational process that generates Alice’s
states, and a computable function fA which “reads out” Al-
ice’s current state from the full computational process. But
15 Note that Bob1st is not a well-defined “object”, but a handy way to
talk about the first-person perspective corresponding to x.
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FIG. 3. Informal illustration of the setup considered in this section. We have an observer A (Alice) who finds herself to be part of a
simple computational process which generates some measure µ (according to Theorem 4.4). This means that the computational process
is what she may call her “external world” as explained in Section 4; her observer state (here e.g. x = x1x2x3x4) is a function fA of the
process’ state (see also Figure 2). Suppose that there is another simple computable function fB , acting on the states of this process,
which yields another string of bits that grows over time. Then Alice can interpret this as “having another observer Bob3rd in her world”,
and her world will yield a probability measure P3rd determining what is going to happen to Bob3rd in her world. However, Bob’s
first-person perspective, Bob1st, is governed by algorithmic probability, P1st ≡ P; and these probabilities may apriori be completely
unrelated. In other words, what Bob1st will probably really see next (symbolized by the grey speech bubble) may be very different from
what Alice will probably be seeing Bob3rd see next. But as we show in Theorem 5.2 below, for a large number of bits, the conditional
probabilities P1st and P3rd will be very close to each other — in this sense, Alice and Bob will be “part of the same world”, and Bob3rd
will be a probabilistically faithful “representation” of Bob1st. This is a probabilistic form of emergent objective reality.
now, in addition, we have another computable map (random
variable) fB which reads out another observer state, as il-
lustrated in Figure 3. That is, fB reads out the state of
Bob3rd.
Since the computational process is probabilistic, its state
at some computational time16 t is a random variable, g(t).
For every t, the function fA reads out Alice’s observer state
fA(g(t)) at that computational moment. Similarly, fB(g(t))
will yield another observer state. If fB is suitably chosen,
then fB(g(t + 1)) will always be either equal to fB(g(t)) or
one bit longer, i.e. the bit string read out by fB will “grow”
over time. For fA, this is automatically true due to the way
that the output of a monotone Turing machine is defined.
Because g(t) is a random variable, we have to distinguish
the following two probability distributions:
1. The distribution P3rd on fB(g(t)) (i.e. on the states
of Bob3rd) that is induced by the probabilities of the
different computational histories g(t);
2. the distribution P1st ≡ P which Postulates 3.2 claim
to determine what actually happens to Bob1st. This is
algorithmic probability.
In our example, if there is an almost 100% chance that Alice
will see that Bob3rd sees the sun rise tomorrow, then this is
16 Note that this does not assume or imply that the computational
process has some “Newtonian” notion of absolute time; it only means
that there is at least one way to parametrize the progression of the
computation, which does not exclude the possibility that the process
has a causal structure that resembles e.g. that of general relativity.
a probability assignment of P3rd ≈ 1. If we ask what Bob1st
will actually see, then this asks for the corresponding value
of P1st.
Apriori, both probabilities can take different values. How-
ever, if they are in fact different, then we have a quite strange
situation, reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s philosophical con-
cept of a “zombie” [32]: Bob1st would in fact not subjectively
experience what Alice sees Bob3rd experience, but would di-
vert into his own “parallel world” with high probability. This
does not mean that Alice will subsequently be confronted
with a “soulless” Bob3rd (since fB will still produce an ob-
server state, associated with some first-person perspective);
it would somehow, very roughly, mean that Alice is con-
fronted with some sort of “very unlikely instance” of Bob1st,
and that the Bob1st that she knew earlier has somehow sub-
jectively “fallen out of the universe”. It is probably save to
say that we lack both intuition and terminology to describe
non-mathematically what that would mean17.
As we will soon see, the good news is that the properties of
algorithmic probability imply that this strange phenomenon
17 Note that this would be much stranger than the simple effect of
having different “computational branches”, following different values
that the random variable g(t) can take. Similarly as in Everettian
interpretations of quantum mechanics, a “many-worlds”-like picture
suggests that we should imagine different “instances” of Alice and
Bob, following the different branches. Nevertheless, if Alice and Bob
meet in one branch of an Everettian world, they will both be subject
to the same objective chances of joint future observations (like seeing
the sun rise tomorrow). For “probabilistic zombies” as just described,
this would not be the case.
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will not typically happen in every-day situations18 (but see
Subsection 5.2). Instead, P1st and P3rd will be very close
to each other under natural circumstances. To prove this
formally in Theorem 5.2, we have to carefully specify the
assumptions that go into the proof.
Assumption 5.1. Consider observer Alice who is part of
an external world as explained in Subsection 4.2, i.e. of some
probabilistic computational process which will be in some
state g(t) at every computational time t ∈ N.
Let fB be a computable map that assigns to each g(t)
(from some t0 on) an observer state. We interpret fB as a
“locator function” that reads out the state of Bob3rd as he
appears in the computation. We make two assumptions:
• For every t ≥ t0, fB(g(t+1)) is either equal to fB(g(t))
or one bit longer (otherwise it would not consistently
describe the temporal evolution of an observer state);
• for every t ≥ t0, there will be some t′ > t with
fB(g(t
′)) 6= fB(g(t)) with unit probability.
The map fB can be interpreted as an “observer localiza-
tion” of Bob3rd [72] inside the computational world. Intu-
itively, the first assumption above says that Bob3rd survives
indefinitely in Alice’s world, and he never forgets anything19.
The second assumption says that Bob3rd does not become
“eternally frozen”.
Suppose that Alice encounters Bob3rd at computational
time t0, and his state is z := fB(g(t0)). As explained above,
there are now two different conditional probability distribu-
tions: on the one hand P3rd(y|z), i.e. the probability that
the state of Bob3rd in Alice’s world changes in the future by
acquiring the next bits y1y2 . . . ym = y. And on the other
hand, we have P1st(y|z) ≡ P(y|z), i.e. the chance that an
observer in state z will, as seen from his first-person per-
spective, obtain these next bits.
Our assumptions above imply that P3rd is a computable
measure. This has a compelling consequence:
Theorem 5.2 (Emergence of objective reality).
In the setting of Assumption 5.1, the probabilities P3rd that
determine the fate of Bob3rd within Alice’s external world
are asymptotically close to the actual chances P ≡ P1st
of Bob1st’s first-person perspective. That is, with P3rd-
probability one,
P3rd(y|z1z2 . . . zn) n→∞−→ P1st(y|z1z2 . . . zn), (6)
i.e. the difference between the conditional versions of P3rd
and P1st tends to zero.
This theorem follows from applying Solomonoff induction
as formalized in Lemma 4.3 to the computable measure P3rd.
18 Strictly speaking, this kind of consistency (as expressed in Theo-
rem 5.2) would not necessarily have to hold in order to have a well-
defined theory; physics would still make sense in a solipsistic world
in which every observer is surrounded by probabilistic zombies. But
such a world would be truly terrifying.
19 This reminds us of the fact that we are working with deficient Pos-
tulates 3.2; memory erasure would be described with Postulates 3.1.
In this sense, Alice and Bob “inhabit the same world” —
Bob3rd as encountered by Alice is a faithful representation
of an actual first-person perspective of some Bob1st. Note
that this theorem is formulated from Alice’s perspective: it
is Alice who assigns P3rd-probability one to convergence.
At first sight, this seems to resemble the idea of Bayesian
consistency [73]: if two agents start with different prior dis-
tributions, but receive equivalent data, their Bayesian poste-
rior distributions will in many cases converge towards each
other. In this view, both agents are by definition part of the
“same world” such that they receive data which is in princi-
ple compatible between the two, and the prior and posterior
distributions represent their beliefs. In the approach of this
paper, however, this not the case: P3rd and P1st are not be-
liefs but actual chances, and observers are not assumed to
be part of the same world in the usual sense.
5.2. Probabilistic zombies
Theorem 5.2 shows in what sense our theory predicts the
emergence of objective reality : while the fundamental ontol-
ogy is given by each observer’s first-person perspective, there
is nevertheless a tendency for observers to agree that they see
a specific objective “external world”. However, this theorem
relies on two premises as formalized in Assumption 5.1:
• Bob is “old/complex enough”: the length n = `(z)
of Bob’s observer state z must be large.
• Bob “survives and remembers forever”: the lo-
cator function fB that is supposed to read out Bob’s
state from Alice’s world will always yield a consistently
growing observer state, even in the very distant future.
While it seems plausible that both assumptions are satisfied
approximately in typical situations, they will not hold in all
cases. In this subsection and the next, we will have a closer
look at what happens if we drop these two assumptions. Let
us start by dropping the first of the two — namely, that Bob
is “old/complex enough”:
Observation 5.3 (Probabilistic zombies). In the notation of
Theorem 5.2, the probabilities P3rd that determine the state
of Bob3rd in Alice’s world, and P1st ≡ P that determine
Bob1st’s actual first-person chances, will in general be very
different if the length n ob Bob’s observer state z is small.
If this is the case, we will say that Bob3rd is a “probabilistic
zombie” for Alice. In particular, this will be the case if Bob’s
current state z is too simple, namely if K(z) K(P3rd).
As explained in Section 5, this notion of “probabilistic
zombie” vaguely resembles Wittgenstein’s notion of a zom-
bie [32], but it is on the one hand more precise and on the
other hand less intuitive. From Alice’s perspective, it means
that Bob3rd does not faithfully (in probability) represent the
actual first-person perspective of some corresponding Bob1st.
See the previous subsection for a more detailed explanation.
Since the complexity K(z) tends to grow with n = `(z),
the statement that K(z) is small can roughly be interpreted
as saying that “Bob is still young”. But this intuition should
be taken with a grain of salt, since there is no monotonous
relationship between length and complexity.
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In more detail, K(z) has to be compared to K(P3rd), the
complexity of the measure P3rd as defined in Theorem 2.5.
The latter is the length of the shortest program that gen-
erates P3rd an a universal computer — in other words, it
is the description length of the probabilistic laws of Alice’s
world, together with a description of Bob3rd’s location fB .
We can thus interpret the quantitative statement in Obser-
vation 5.3 as follows: If Bob3rd’s complexity is much smaller
than the number of bits it takes to describe the laws of physics
in Alice’s world, and to locate Bob3rd inside that world, then
Bob3rd is a probabilistic zombie for Alice.
We will not formally prove this quantitative statement,
but give some intuition as to why it represents a reasonable
conjecture. To this end, let us return to Theorem 5.2 which
proves the asymptotic emergence of objective reality. Intu-
itively, if n is large, then Bob’s state z = z1z2 . . . zn contains
enough information to infer via universal induction, without
reasonable doubt, that this data has been generated by Alice’s
world. In other words, a description of Alice’s world, and
thus of P3rd, can be obtained from z. If this can be done via
some algorithm, then we could conclude that
K(P3rd) . K(z).
Therefore, if this inequality is very strongly violated, then
we expect that P3rd 6' P1st. Let us go into some more
detail. Consider some enumeration m1,m2,m3, . . . of the
enumerable semimeasures, and define
MV (w) :=
∞∑
j=1
2−K(j)mj(w) (w ∈ S \ {ε}). (7)
This is well-defined since
∑
j 2
−K(j) ≤ 1 [46]. The result-
ing semimeasure MV is enumerable since K(j) can be com-
putably estimated from above, and it is universal by con-
struction. Therefore, it is the semimeasure corresponding
to some universal monotone Turing machine V in virtue of
Definition 2.1. It follows that
MV (y|z) =
∞∑
j=1
2−K(j)
mj(z)
MV (z)
mj(y|z). (8)
Starting with this equation, emergence of objectivity as in
Theorem 5.2 can be interpreted intuitively (but not fully
rigorously) as follows. Bob’s first-person probability P ≡
P1st ≈ M is a mixture of all enumerable semimeasures as
in (8). It is as if there was a “correct” computable measure
P3rd which is not known to Bob, and hence Bob holds a
prior MV , i.e. a prior distribution over all computable (and
merely enumerable) measures (and semimeasures). On re-
ceiving new data z, Bob updates his beliefs to MV (·|z). At
some point, it turns out that a single term of the infinite
(sub-)convex combination dominates: namely, mj = P3rd.
This can only happen if
• P3rd(z) is not too small, i.e. Bob’s current state is “typ-
ical” for this distribution;
• K(j) is not too large, i.e. it is easy to pick P3rd = mj
from the enumeration of semimeasures (intuitively, this
amounts to P3rd itself being simple, i.e. we expect that
K(P3rd) ≈ K(j) is also not too large).
• On the other hand, all other mi for i 6= j must either be
complex in comparison (i.e. K(i) K(j)) or represent
“worse explanations” of Bob’s current state than P3rd,
in the sense that mi(z) P3rd(z).
But if K(z)  K(P3rd), then such a “concentration” on
mj = P3rd cannot happen. To see why, note that from a
description of z we can construct a simple algorithm that
generates a computable measure µ with µ(z) = 1, and which
has some arbitrary values for extensions of z (say, ones that
differ from P3rd). If i is the simplest index such that mi = µ,
we will thus expect that
K(i) ≈ K(µ) . K(z) K(P3rd) ≈ K(j).
Therefore, µ = mi will have much higher weight in (8) than
P3rd = mj , and emergence of objectivity will fail: Bob3rd
will be a probabilistic zombie.
5.3. Subjective immortality
The next part of our analysis will be to see what happens
if we drop the assumption that “Bob survives and remem-
bers forever”. We all have an intuition for such situations
— a possible scenario is (boldly and humorously) illustrated
in Figure 4. Let us work within the framework of Subsec-
tion 5.1: In Alice’s external world, there is another observer
Bob3rd, characterized by some simple locator function fB .
Let us assume that, indeed, the probabilities P1st(y|x) and
P3rd(y|x) have been close to another for quite a while, such
that Bob3rd is not a probabilistic zombie for Alice.
In the scenario of Figure 4, the locator function fB gen-
erates a growing sequence of observer states, as demanded
by Assumption 5.1. However, if we interpret the hitting me-
teorite as an act of memory erasure, then fB will not have
this property any more on the “gray” branch of the com-
putational tree, for times t > t′: that is, fB(g(t′ + 1)) will
neither be equal to fB(g(t
′)) nor be one bit longer, but will
perhaps (depending on the definition of fB) yield the empty
string or some other junk.
Clearly, we can somehow modify or extend fB to the ter-
minating branch, such that the resulting map (say, f˜B) will
keep on satisfying Assumption 5.1. But the point is that
there is no unique, “natural” way to define such an exten-
sion in general. Consequently, there will be many possible
f˜B , and since they are all approximately on “equal footing”,
each one of them will be more complex than fB . But we
have assumed that fB is simple, in order to have an emer-
gent notion of objectivity in the first place.
Recall the construction of P3rd from Subsection 5.1: Al-
ice’s probabilistic computational world generates a corre-
sponding measure on the observer states as read out by
fB , i.e. on the states of Bob3rd. If we repeat this construc-
tion now, without relying on the validity of Assumption 5.1,
then we can still obtain the measure P3rd up to computa-
tional time t′. But from time t′ + 1 on, some computational
branches are “cut off” by not supplying any valid new ob-
server states for Bob. Thus, instead of a measure, we obtain
a semimeasure P3rd.
While Theorem 4.4 is not valid for computable semimea-
sures, its non-asymptotic version from Subsection 5.2 still
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FIG. 4. Colorful and (hopefully) humorous illustration of the content of Observation 5.4. The tree represents the possible histories of
a computational process that corresponds to Alice’s external world, as explained in Subsection 4.2. The possible values of the random
variable g(t) (the state of the computation at time t) correspond to the vertices of a tree graph, directed upwards. The subset of
vertices for which fB(g(t)) yields a growing (in t) sequence of bit strings is colored in black. However, there are some computational
histories (in gray) that do not satisfy this constraint. The bottom left shows Alice and Bob who are happy and alive and observe
an approaching meteorite. Their states are given by fA(g(t
′)) and fB(g(t′)), respectively; that is, they are in this sense part of the
computational process. They both “share the same world” in the sense of emergent objective reality — this basically corresponds to
the scenario of Theorem 5.2. Then, this external world will transition probabilistically into one of two possible scenarios g(t′+ 1): first,
a meteorite that has previously approached unfortunately hits Bob3rd, which happens with probability 99% (right-hand side); second,
the meteorite fortunately misses Bob3rd (left-hand side, top), which happens with probability 1%. While both scenarios are possible
for Alice, the postulates of our theory say, however, that this is not true for Bob1st: according to Postulates 3.2, Bob1st must transition
into some other observer state next. Therefore, the unfortunate meteorite-hitting branch has no relevance for Bob1st. This is formally
reflected by the fact that the distribution generated by fB will be a semimeasure, not a measure. Instead of the termination by the
meteorite, something else will happen to Bob1st — but what this will be is a question that cannot be answered within Postulates 3.2.
The answer will have to wait for a formalization of Postulates 3.1.
applies: MV (y|z) in (8) can still concentrate on the semimea-
sure mj = P3rd if K(j) is small (which it is if Alice’s world
has simple laws) and if mj(z) is large:
Observation 5.4 (Subjective immortality). The scenario in
Figure 4 can be understood as follows. At (not too early)
computational times t < t′, there is “emergent objectivity”:
the probabilities P3rd that determine the chances of Bob3rd
as seen by Alice in her external world are close to the actual
chances P ≡ P1st of Bob1st’s state transitions. This is a
finite-time version of Theorem 4.4.
This happens whenever (8) concentrates20 (quickly
enough) on mj = P3rd, which is however a semimeasure
instead of a measure if there are branches on which Bob3rd
is terminated. If the total survival probability
∑
ymj(y|z) is
zero or too small, then the semimeasure mj = P3rd becomes
irrelevant for Bob1st’s future states despite 2
−K(j)mj(z) be-
ing large. If this is the case, then other semimeasures will
determine Bob1st’s states from that moment on, and Alice’s
world loses its relevance for Bob1st.
20 It is sufficient that most of the probability weight is distributed on
semimeasures that make the same or very similar predictions as P3rd
for the first few relevant states.
It would be very interesting to say in more detail what
Bob1st would see in the scenario of Figure 4, but the answer
to this question depends very strongly on the type of postu-
lates that we decide to use. If we, as we have done so far,
use deficient Postulates 3.2, then Bob1st will transition into
another state next which is one bit longer (and so forth); we
would have to analyze the algorithmic probabilities of these
possible futures, which may well depend on details of Al-
ice’s world and Bob’s state at time t′. Bob1st would then
subjectively survive and remember.
However, this conclusion is likely an artefact of the defi-
ciency that Postulates 3.2 do not allow us to reason about
memory erasure (forgetting). To do so, we need a formal-
ization of Postulates 3.1 instead. We therefore have to defer
the answer to this interesting question to future work. How-
ever, we might speculate that the meteorite incident comes
with substantial memory erasure for Bob1st, in which case
his journey through the space of observer states would start
anew. In any case, it seems likely that ideas like “quantum
suicide” [45, 74–76], or rather their adaption to our setting,
do not work in the context of our theory.
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6. APPLICATION TO EXOTIC SCENARIOS
One major motivation for the theory of this paper was to
have a unified approach to answering the question “What
will I see next?” — one that applies to ordinary physics sit-
uations, but also to more exotic scenarios like Parfit’s tele-
transportation paradox. In the following two subsection, we
will see that our approach lives up to these hopes, at least
in principle, notwithstanding its incompleteness as explained
in Section 3.
6.1. Dissolving the Boltzmann brain problem
If the approach of this paper captures a grain of truth
about physics, then we face a substantial revision of some
basic assumptions about the world. Thus, it should not come
as a surprise (and may indeed be regarded a sign of predictive
power) that our approach suggests revisions in those areas
of physics that are asking fundamental questions about the
nature of our universe and the role of the observer.
One major research area of this kind is cosmology. I am
not a cosmologist, and most questions and problems of cos-
mology have nothing to do with the approach of this paper.
However, there are some very fundamental questions of how
to even think about our world for which our approach will be
relevant — not because we could solve any of the cosmolo-
gists’ problems, but because our “first-person-first” perspec-
tive changes the type of questions that we may want to pose
in the first place.
We have already seen a simple example of this in Subsec-
tion 4.2; let us recapitulate it in the context of the present
subsection. One instance of cosmology’s measure problem [2]
can be phrased as follows: why did our universe have ther-
modynamically atypical low-entropic initial conditions? As
we have seen, our approach predicts that observers will find
themselves to be part of a simple probabilistic computational
process. It is a generic feature of such processes that they
start in some initial state, and then their time evolution un-
folds with increasing complexity.
While there is no notion of energy or thermodynamics in
these information-theoretic statements, there turns out to
be a bridge between algorithmic probability and thermo-
dynamics: Kolmogorov complexity K can itself be regarded
as a notion of entropy. In fact, K is sometimes called “al-
gorithmic entropy”, and it has been applied directly as a
measure of entropy in thermodynamics, cf. Section 8 of [46]
or [81]. While standard thermodynamic entropy is a function
of a probability distribution (such as the uniform distribu-
tion on all accessible microstates), Kolmogorov complexity
is defined for single realizations of an ensemble (that is, for
single microstates). There are numerous close relationships
between complexity and entropy [58, 59, 82]. For instance,
average Kolmogorov complexity equals entropy : if P is any
computable probability distribution on S, then [46]
H(P ) ≤
∑
x∈S
P (x)K(x) ≤ H(P ) + K(P ) +O(1),
where H(P ) = −∑x∈S P (x) log2 P (x) is Shannon entropy.
This implies that notions of algorithmic complexity can in
many cases be read as if they were statements about entropy.
Thus, the approach of this paper predicts directly that
observers will find low-entropic conditions if they retrodict
their external world far enough to the past. This dissolves
the need for a “mechanistic” explanation of simple (ther-
modynamically atypical) initial conditions. It is not neces-
sary to postulate, for example, that our universe has devel-
oped as a thermodynamic fluctuation from another “meta-
universe”’ [4]; our theory predicts simple initial conditions
without any such assumptions. The point of view taken in
this paper is that the question of “why there is a world in the
first place” requires (and has) an explanation that is of a dif-
ferent category than the usual argumentation with which we
explain phenomena within our world. Using thermodynamic
reasoning, for example, assumes that we already have a cer-
tain amount of structure (basically fundamentally reversible
dynamics according to some symplectic structure, leading to
a notion of energy that is preserved) that is ultimately part
of what we want to explain in the first place.
If we assume the (approximate) validity of the approach of
this paper, then there is another puzzle related to cosmology
which gets dissolved: the Boltzmann brain problem [3, 4].
For our purpose, it can be summarized in the following way:
Suppose that our universe is “combinatorially large” in
some sense, for example due to eternal inflation [77]. Then,
because of statistical fluctuations, many observers (“Boltz-
mann brains”) will come into existence by mere chance, sim-
ply appear for a short time, surrounded by chaos, and then
disappear again. Under certain assumptions on the cosmo-
logical model, there will be far “more” Boltzmann brains out
there than there are “ordinary” observers (like we think we
are). Thus, in such cases, should observers (like us) assign
high probability to being a Boltzmann brain rather than hav-
ing been generated by a long evolutionary process?
Even if we ignore fundamental questions of conceptual va-
lidity, there are some obvious practical obstacles to making
arguments of this kind scientifically sound. For example, the
argument depends on the choice of method for how to count
observers (“natural” ones as well as Boltzmann brains) [78].
Some cosmologists try to infer constraints on the cosmo-
logical model from assuming that we are not Boltzmann
brains [79], but there is no consensus on how the calcula-
tions should be done in detail. As an example, [3] and [4]
argue that inflation cures the Boltzmann brain problem, but
other authors [80] come to different conclusions.
For concreteness, let us formulate the Boltzmann brain
puzzle in the terminology of observer states. Suppose we
have a universe (corresponding to some “large” cosmological
model) which contains a single observer, Bob, who remem-
bers having lived a rich life full of experiences in a stan-
dard, low-entropic planet-like environment. Let x be Bob’s
observer state. For concreteness, let us assume that the
combinatorially large universe contains about 1090 thermal
fluctuations — Boltzmann brains — that contain, by mere
chance, a perfect copy of x. That is, each of these brains
also thinks that they are Bob, that they have lived this rich
life on a planet, and that it will subsequently continue as
usual. For the sake of the argument, let us furthermore as-
sume that each of these Boltzmann brains will subsequently
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learn21 some additional bits y = y1y2 . . . ym, transitioning
into an observer state xy that corresponds to an extremely
strange and unexpected, “disordered” experience [5], before
they perhaps finally disappear.
A question that naturally comes to mind is the following:
Suppose I am in observer state x at this moment, having
all these memories and beliefs. How do I know if I am “re-
ally” Bob, or if I am one of those Boltzmann brains? But
in the approach of this paper, this question is meaningless:
observers are not material objects in some universe, but ob-
servers are their observer states. That is: I am x. In some
sense, I am Bob on the planet and at the same time I am
each and every one of those Boltzmann brains. Except that
this is a void statement, so let us retract it, and let us notice
that we have to retract the question as meaningless.
However, there is a reformulation of the question which
does have meaning in the context of our theory: will my ex-
periences in the next moments be those of Bob on the planet,
or those of one of the Boltzmann brains? To formalize this
question, denote by z = z1z2 . . . zm the m bits that ordinary
Bob on the planet will subsequently acquire next. Then, we
have to compare the conditional probability of those bits z
with that of the “Boltzmann brain bits” y, i.e.
P(z|x) versus P(y|x).
Now, since there are 1090 Boltzmann brains, but only one
version of Bob on the planet, naive counting would suggest
that P(y|x) ≈ 1090P(z|x), so that we should very strongly
expect to make one of the strange “Boltzmann brain obser-
vations” next. However, the approach of this paper, as for-
mulated in Postulates 3.2, claims that this is incorrect: the
two probabilities above are equal to conditional algorithmic
probability ; counting numbers of objects in some universe is
completely irrelevant, and the probabilities are independent
of the cosmological model.
The question above can be analyzed within the formalism
of Subsection 5.1. We have the very large, but algorithmi-
cally simple, probabilistic universe (say, it is Alice’s external
world), and we have a variety of choices of “picking” certain
objects in this universe. On the one hand, there is Bob on
the planet (“Bobp”). This will be formulated by some locator
function fp (“p” is for “planet”) that somehow reads Bob’s
state from the state of the universe22. On the other hand, we
can define some other locator function fBB that tracks one
of the Boltzmann brains (“BobBB”); we will shortly discuss
different options for how to do this.
These locator functions generate “third-person probabili-
ties” Pp3rd and P
BB
3rd. We can now reformulate the question
above as follows:
Is P(w|x) ≈ Pp3rd(w|x) or P(w|x) ≈ PBB3rd(w|x)?
21 A moment’s thought shows that the Boltzmann brains can be com-
pletely ignored, according to Postulates 3.2, if this is not the case.
22 How fp is defined in detail is irrelevant for our purpose; it is some
function of not too high complexity that somehow extracts Bob’s
state from the fundamental state of the universe. Note that this does
not mean that the universe has to be discrete in any naive sense
(spacetime pixels etc.), but only that it is an abstract process that
has in principle a finite description. At this point, we are ignoring
quantum theory, but we will turn to it in Section 7.
We can ask this for all possible “next bits” w, in particular
for w = y and w = z.
Since Pp3rd and P
BB
3rd give very different conditional prob-
abilities, only one of the approximate equalities can be true.
That is, at least one of Bobp and BobBB must be a proba-
bilistic zombie in the sense of Subsection 5.2.
Let us consider a specific choice of locator function fBB.
Suppose that fBB scans the universe in an algorithmically
simple pseudo-random fashion, until it finds some record of
some observer state s. Subsequently, it keeps on searching
that way (starting in the vicinity of its previous strike) until
it finds, within a prescribed number of time steps, another
state sa, with a ∈ {0, 1} — and so forth, producing an eter-
nally growing sequence of observer states. Now suppose that
this process actually produces the observer state x at some
point. Since there are 1090 Boltzmann brains in the universe,
but only a single Bobp, this means that our locator function
will most probably be pointing to a Boltzmann brain.
This locator function fBB is algorithmically not very com-
plex; perhaps of comparable complexity as fp. Hence, if we
consider the corresponding (semi)measure mi = P
BB
3rd in (8),
then K(i) will not be too large since K(PBB3rd) isn’t either.
However, mi(x), the probability that fBB will actually pro-
duce x by mere chance, is combinatorially small, certainly
much smaller than Pp3rd(x). This means that mi will defi-
nitely not be dominating the sum; its weight will be much
smaller than that of Pp3rd, and hence BobBB will be a prob-
abilistic zombie.
What if we define another locator function f ′BB where we
try to circumvent the smallness of this probability? For ex-
ample, let f ′BB scan the universe in an algorithmically simple
pseudo-random fashion, pretty much like fBB, until it finds
specifically a random fluctuation in observer state x. (This
function also has to return prefixes of x at earlier times, and
it has to make sure that the fluctuation will produce fur-
ther growing bit strings for a while.) The (semi)measure
mj = P
′BB
3rd in (8) has now mj(x) = 1. However, in this
case, f ′BB must contain a complete description of x, and so
K(P′BB3rd) ≥ K(x). But then, Observation 5.3 suggests that
Bob’BB3rd is a probabilistic zombie.
In summary, the existence of Boltzmann brains has no
relevance whatsoever for anyone’s first-person perspective:
in the terminology of Subsection 5.2, these are probabilistic
zombies. This also implies that the assumption that “we are
not Boltzmann brains” cannot be used to rule out cosmolog-
ical models, in contrast to the hopes of some cosmologists.
6.2. Simulating agents on a computer
This subsection turns to a set of questions that may attain
particular relevance in the near future with ongoing techno-
logical progress: namely, the problem to make decisions in
situations that involve difficult questions of personal identity.
A specific instance of this problem is the question of brain
emulation: would it make sense to invest in technology that
scans our brains and simulates them to high accuracy af-
ter our death? Would the simulation be “conscious”, and
would we actually “wake up” in the simulation? The the-
ory of this paper does not claim to make any statements
about consciousness directly, but it does claim to make pre-
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dictions about the first-person experience of observers. It
is this technical, information-theoretic notion of first-person
perspective that is the subject of interest here, not the spe-
cific, high-level, so far ill-defined notion of consciousness.
Many philosophers, neuroscientists, and computer scien-
tists have thought about the question of brain emulation.
Here I will not discuss any specific details of this problem, but
only its very fundamental information-theoretic basis which,
as I argue below, allows our theory, at least in principle, to
make some concrete predictions. Concretely, I will follow a
discussion in [118] (see also [119]). The authors discuss the
idea to create an “oracle artificial intelligence” (OAI) as an
AI that is confined to some “box” and only interacts with
the real world by answering questions. Restricting it to be
an “oracle” in this sense (and not allowing it to act as an
agent in the actual physical world) is meant to reduce po-
tential risks (for example, the risk that the AI takes over
and destroys our planet). However, the authors argue that
not all risks can be eliminated: for example, the OAI might
simulate human minds in its memory if this helps to answer
some questions more accurately. Then, according to [118],
“[...] the problem with the OAI simulating human minds
is mainly ethical: are these simulated humans conscious and
alive? And, if they are, are they not being killed when the
simulation is ended? Are you yourself not currently being
simulated by an OAI seeking to resolve a specific question
on human psychology [11]? If so, how would you feel if the
simulation were to be ended? In view of its speed and the
sort of questions it would be asked, the number of humans
that the OAI may have cause to simulate could run into the
trillions. Thus, the vast majority of human beings could end
up being doomed simulations. This is an extreme form of
“mind crime” [120] where the OAI causes great destruction
just by thinking.”
The worldview that underlies this argumentation is clearly
reminiscent of the standard cosmological ontology of the
Boltzmann brain problem in Subsection 6.1, with the “tril-
lions of doomed simulations” analogous to the vast number
of Boltzmann brains in a large universe. We have already
argued that the approach of this paper implies that naive
counting is inappropriate in cosmology; hence it should come
as no surprise that it also implies a substantial shift of per-
spective on the brain emulation problem.
According to Postulates 3.2 and the general view expressed
by our approach, an “observer” is not a physical object in
some universe, but it is its observer state. Observer states are
abstract structure that cannot be “created” or “destroyed”,
neither by physics are we know it nor by computer simu-
lation (see also the discussion on subjective immortality in
Subsection 5.2). The only way in which the emergent ex-
ternal world (or a computer simulation) can affect observers
is by impacting conditional algorithmic probability, which in
turn determines the chances of future observations: regard-
ing a “world” as a computational process, what happens in
this world influences the statistics of its outputs, which in
turn enters the definition of algorithmic probability. This is
the sense in which Bob’s probability of suffering increases if
Alice decides to beat him up.
Thus, we conclude that starting a computer simulation
does not “bring an observer into existence”, and shutting
down a simulation does not “kill” the simulated observer.
But there still remains the question of what happens, say, if
we decide to torture a simulated observer; does it increase
someone’s probability of suffering?
Phrasing the question in this form seems to assume that
it makes sense to talk about “agency” in our approach, i.e.
that we have a choice in the first place. At first glance, this
does not obviously make sense, as there is no fundamental
notion of “free will” built into our theory: in some sense,
observers passively follow the stochastic random walk on the
set of observer states. However, exactly the same is true for
all other theories of physics that we have: in classical me-
chanics, observers act perfectly deterministically, whereas in
quantum mechanics, their behavior is given by probabilistic
laws. Arguably, probabilistic indeterminism does not auto-
matically entail any notion of “free will” (it is more like being
slave to a die).
For this reason, the old philosophical debate about free
will applies to our theory in exactly the same way as it does
to all other physical theories. Even though this is a fasci-
nating problem, its philosophical resolution is not important
for the discussion in this section23. Instead, let us follow a
pragmatic approach for the time being: whatever “free will”
fundamentally means, it is an undeniable experience that we
somehow have to decide what to do tomorrow. Therefore, it
is essential for practical purposes to treat our actions as not
predetermined, and to argue counterfactually what would
happen if we decided one way or the other. Henceforth we
will treat the actions of our prototype of observer, Alice, in
her emergent external world as “free” in this sense.
Equipped with a notion of agency of observers, we can
now analyze what our theory has to say about torturing a
simulated mind. Suppose that Alice the guinea pig is in
some observer state x, a standard “happy state”, describing
her experience of eating a large and tasty piece of cabbage.
However, imagine that some possible future state xy is a
“suffering state”, possibly representing the experience of a
painful medical procedure that we would like to test on em-
ulated Alice in a computer simulation.
Suppose that we have a simulation running (which may
be a deterministic or probabilistic algorithm), and emulated
Alice is in observer state x. Furthermore, suppose that we
know that in the next few time steps, our simulation is going
to perform the transition to the suffering state with high
probability Psim(y|x)  0 (unity in the deterministic case).
Are we ethically allowed to run the simulation? Should we
shut it down? Should we have refrained from running it in
the first place?
Clearly, what actually matters for Alice is P(y|x), her first-
person probability of suffering according to Postulates 3.2.
Arguably, it is ethically correct for us to run the simulation
either if Alice’s first-person suffering probability is small de-
spite our simulation, or if it is large but our simulation can-
23 Even though it is not important for this paper, I would still like to
advertise the plausibility of a compatibilist point of view, as laid out
very clearly, for example, by Dennett [121]. Furthermore, theoretical
computer science can add an important twist to it via the notion of
computational irreducibility [36, 122–124], which can be used to jus-
tify the assignment of autonomy or agency to algorithms. Identifying
“ourselves” with the information processing in our brains will then
allow us to claim a status of information-theoretically well-defined
autonomy or “freedom”.
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not be regarded as the cause for this. In more detail, we have
the following two arguably acceptable scenarios:
(1) P(y|x) ≈ 0 even though Psim(y|x)  0. This would
imply that simulated Alice is a probabilistic zombie in
the sense of Observation 5.3.
(2) Both P(y|x) and Psim(y|x) are large, but P(y|x) would
also be as large if we decided not to implement the
specific simulation.
One way to make sure that one of these scenarios applies is
by running a closed simulation. By this I mean a (possi-
bly probabilistic) simulation algorithm that runs completely
autonomously, without accepting any data from the external
world. Its behavior will only depend on an initially speci-
fied program, plus a sequence of random input bits24 if the
simulation is meant to be non-deterministic.
As long as simulated Alice is still very simple, she will auto-
matically be a probabilistic zombie due to Observation 5.3.
If our simulation tortures her at this point, this will be of
no relevance for Alice’s first-person perspective; we are in
Scenario (1)25. But we know from Theorem 5.2 that this
situation cannot last very long: if the simulation runs long
enough, Alice will loose zombie status, and simulated Alice
will more and more become an accurate representation of
the actual first-person perspective that corresponds to the
simulated observer states. However, in this case we run into
Scenario (2): if the simulation tortures Alice with high prob-
ability at this point, we have Psim(y|x) ≈ P(y|x)  0, but
the cause of P(y|x) being large is not that we have launched
the simulation: rather, the cause is that the simulated world
exists mathematically as a simple abstract computational pro-
cess which generates the transition to the suffering state with
non-negligible probability. This is a mathematical fact, re-
gardless of whether we actually run the simulation or not.
To see this, recall MV (y|x) from equation (8). It is a mix-
ture of semimeasures mj , and (at least) one specific choice
of j will yield the measure mj which describes Alice’s statis-
tics within our simulation. If simulated Alice has lost zombie
status, and Theorem 4.4 applies, then this specific mj will
dominate the statistical mixture of semimeasures in (8), by
having small K(j) and large mj(x) (in comparison to other
semimeasures). However, these properties are mathematical
statements that are completely independent of whether we
choose to implement the simulation or not.
In other words: running a closed simulation merely dis-
plays the world which is simulated; it does not “bring it into
existence” in any metaphysical sense. Thus, running a closed
torturing simulation (or terminating a closed simulation) is
ethically unproblematic since it has no causal effect, simi-
larly as watching a documentary about a war (or stopping
24 Since our external world is in general probabilistic (cf. Subsec-
tion 4.2), we may input actual random bits into the simulation, or,
alternatively, pseudorandom bits; our analysis below will apply to
both cases, as long as the simulation produces a “typical” instance
of the corresponding probabilistic process. This means in particu-
lar that the pseudorandom input bits are not supposed to smuggle
relevant information about the external world into the simulation.
25 Actually, we are already in Scenario (2) if simulated Alice is a zombie
but nevertheless turns out to have P(y|x) 0.
to watch it) does not actually affect any soldier that is por-
trayed in the documentary.
The situation is completely different if we run an open
simulation, that is, if information is allowed to flow from
the external world into the simulation. Imagine, for exam-
ple, that a team of programmers regularly intervenes with
the simulation (similarly as in Gary Larson’s cartoon “god
at his computer”), or that we start to communicate with
simulated Alice. Exactly as in the closed case, we may still
have an initial phase where Alice is a zombie in the sense of
Scenario (1), and in the long run, Theorem 5.2 implies that
simulated Alice’s first-person chances converge towards the
distribution that we observe in the simulation. This distri-
bution is generated by a simple computational process.
What is this simple computational process? In the closed
case, it is simply the simulation algorithm itself; this algo-
rithm will ultimately represent the best possible compression
of simulated Alice’s states and thus dominate her chances of
future states. In the open case, however, computable pat-
terns of the external world will ultimately enter the simu-
lation. Thus, asymptotically, the best possible compression
of the simulated states will ultimately correspond to a com-
putational process that involves (all or part of) the external
world and the simulation. But then, we become part of the
relevant computational process and will gain causal influence
on the fate of simulated Alice. That is, her conditional prob-
ability P(y|x) ≈ Psim(y|x) will depend substantially on our
choices as agents in our external world.
Thus, in the case of an open simulation, none of the two
scenarios applies, and torturing becomes an actual “mind
crime”. This should not be surprising, given that actual ma-
terial guinea pig Alice is a special case of an open simulation,
with the hardware given by the brain, and the behavior of
other guinea pigs clearly having causal impact on her actual
experience26.
In summary: to emulate responsibly, don’t talk to your
simulation; but if you decide to talk to her, be nice!
7. WHY THE QUANTUM?
While quantum theory (QT) has been named as a main
motivation for this theory in the introduction, the discussion
so far has not touched on QT at all. This may seem odd at
first sight: why have we only talked about classical probabil-
ities and not about transition amplitudes? Isn’t our theory
in contradiction to the observed quantumness of our world,
as Subsection 4.2 seems to predict a classical external world?
Much of this objection rests on intuition that comes from
a certain naive form of wave function realism. Accord-
ing to this view, physics must always talk about material
stuff evolving according to differential equations. The quan-
tum Schro¨dinger equation (or its relativistic or field-theoretic
counterparts) are then often seen as instances of this dogma,
with an actual “thing” |ψ(t)〉 (the quantum state) evolving
in time. Since this “thing” is a complex wave function, and
26 To some extent, there should be a gradual transition between “open”
and “closed”. It thus seems plausible that a small amount of inter-
vention is still compatible with Scenarios (1) and (2).
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not a classical probability distribution, proponents of this
view will intuitively think that the emergent external world
in our theory must be a classical world.
This view ignores the fact that all empirical content of the
quantum state ultimately lies in the prediction of probabil-
ities of measurement outcomes. Therefore, it is consistent
(and in many ways advantageous) to regard quantum states
as “the same stuff as probability distributions”, namely as
states of knowledge, information, or belief in some (yet to
be specified) sense [8, 14, 43, 83, 84]. The departure from
classical physics is in the properties of these probabilities (for
example in the violation of Bell inequalities despite space-like
separation, or the appearance of interference patterns in situ-
ations where classical physics suggests no such patterns), not
in the mathematical description (via complex numbers) that
is used to compute these probabilities. One of the clearest
arguments for this broadly “epistemic” view comes from the
recent wave of reconstructions of QT [19–28], which proves
that the full complex Hilbert space formalism of QT can be
derived from a few natural information-theoretic principles.
Probabilistic predictions comprise everything that we can
ever empirically test about QT. All interpretations of QT
agree on this point [85]; they only differ in the way that they
interpret these probabilities, and in additional claims about
unobservable processes that are declared to be causing the
observed behavior in some (classically) intuitively compre-
hensible or mechanistic terms. Indeed, the motivation for
many of these approaches comes from the traditional intu-
ition described above. In a traditional view, we have an un-
settling situation in QT, which has been termed the measure-
ment problem. From a traditional perspective, the problem
is as follows:
• Typically, the quantum state is evolving unitarily,
according to the Schro¨dinger equation i~|ψ˙(t)〉 =
H|ψ(t)〉. This is analogous to time evolution in classi-
cal mechanics, and in this sense “nice” and intuitive.
• However, sometimes, there are disturbing exceptions
from this rule: this is when we perform a measurement.
Then the state vector seems to collapse in some sense,
violating unitarity.
The traditional narrative is to declare unitary time evolution
as the “standard rule”, and the creation of measurement out-
comes with certain probabilities as an apparent violation of
this rule which is in need of elaborate explanation. For ex-
ample, this point of view is very pronounced in Everettian
interpretations of quantum mechanics [44]. However, taking
actual scientific practice as the starting point, and taking the
manifold evidence (mentioned above) of the epistemic nature
of the quantum state seriously, the more economic and con-
sistent point of view is this: what is “really happening” is
the appearance of measurement outcomes with probabilities
as predicted by the quantum state. In order to not fall into
an overly instrumentalist perspective, we adopt an insight
from QBism [7, 86, 87], namely that the notion of a “mea-
surement outcome” is merely a metaphor (and special case)
of experience, which in the terminology of this paper is the
same as observation. In summary, all there is are obser-
vations (i.e. transitions between observer states), and these
observations are non-deterministic. Quantum states are the
things that determine the probabilities of these observations
(we do not have to settle the question of what “probability”
exactly means here to come to this conclusion). Time evo-
lution of a state is ultimately nothing but a correlation of
these probabilities with some clock variable [88].
The point of view that observations (as part of observer
states) are the primary notion, and that the quantum state
should be interpreted epistemically, dissolves the measure-
ment problem. For more detailed explanations for why this
is an attractive position, see e.g. [89]. Moreover, it can do so
in a particularly nice way within the ontology of this paper,
by refuting the intuitive consequence that quantum states,
as a result, would somehow “not tell us enough about the
physical world” if they are to be understood epistemically.
Observation 7.1 (QT and the measurement problem).
Based on a traditional view of physics, QT is widely re-
garded to suffer from a (conceptual) measurement problem
as sketched above. However, within the approach of this
paper, the measurement problem dissolves: quantum states
are an observer’s states of knowledge (we will explore in more
detail below in what sense), and a measurement update rule
simply corresponds to Bayesian updating. This solution to
the measurement problem is shared with other epistemic in-
terpretations of the quantum state [8, 14, 43, 83].
Moreover, our approach is particularly well-suited to sup-
port such an interpretation: it rejects the fundamentality of
any “external reality”, and thus it suggests that the question
of “what is really going on in the world” may not be answer-
able in the way we would hope for. In this sense, it provides
reasons to expect that observers will typically find a theory
of the quantum kind (with observations or measurements as
a primary notion) describing their world. Furthermore, our
approach says that observations are fundamentally private to
a single observer, and that the notion of a “common exter-
nal reality” for different observers is an approximation that
is only valid under certain conditions (cf. Theorem 5.2). This
makes our approach compatible with “Wigner’s Friend”-type
thought experiments. Some of this will be explored more
thoroughly below.
So QT fits our theory very well from a conceptual point
of view, but can we understand some of its characteristic
features in more technical detail? There is an obvious can-
didate for a characteristically nonclassical effect, namely en-
tanglement. As Schro¨dinger [91] famously wrote in 1935: “I
would not call that one but rather the characteristic trait of
quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure
from classical lines of thought.” More concretely, it is not the
mathematical notion of entanglement in itself that is remark-
able, but rather its operational consequences, in particular
the violation of Bell inequalities [16, 17, 92] (we will use the
usual notion nonlocality for this in the following, without
implying a specific interpretation). Quantum information
theory has shown us a multitude of ways in which nonlocal-
ity can be harnessed for information-theoretic processes that
would be classically impossible, such as device-independent
cryptography [93, 94] or randomness amplification [56, 57].
Thus, nonlocality is an operationally particularly robust sig-
nature of nonclassicality.
In order to study nonlocality in the context of this paper,
we need to talk about a notion of locality in the first place.
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FIG. 5. A private “Bell experiment” that Alice can set up in her emergent external computational world. As explained in the main
text, we assume some rudimentary locality structure, admitting a notion of “spacelike separation” which means that information needs
some (computational) time to travel from A to B and vice versa. Here we assume that A and B are very far away, such that the a
and vi can arrive at B only long after the experiment is finished, and the same for the arrival of b and wi at A. By construction, there
is a local, classical conditional probability distribution P0(v, w|a, b) ≡ P0(vi, wi|a, b) that describes the probabilities of the outcomes of
every single run, given the settings. We consider a scenario in which Alice can “loop back” to her state x of before the experiment,
conditionally on the local outcome vi. Since the probabilities of her future states depend only on her current observer state, she will
not notice that this happens (neither immediately nor at any point in her future). Consequently, she will see a postselected conditional
probability distribution P (v, w|a, b) 6= P0(v, w|a, b) which, as we prove below, can violate Bell inequalities, but must be non-signalling.
Violation of Bell inequalities is predicted by quantum the-
ory for some entangled states on a bipartite Hilbert space
AB. Physically most interesting (and experimentally most
relevant [95]) is the case that A and B correspond to two
spacelike separated laboratories, in which case the observed
correlations cannot be explained by shared classical random-
ness on the causal structure of relativistic spacetime [90].
Therefore, we have to formulate a notion of spacelike sepa-
ration in the context of our theory.
In Subsection 4.2, we have seen that our theory predicts
the appearance of an “external world” that corresponds to
a computational process. There is no prediction (at least
so far) that this computational world admits any representa-
tion in terms of a spacetime structure like the one we observe
in physics. This is one instance of an insight that we have
already described in Subsection 4.2: the notion of “compu-
tation” must be understood in abstract terms. There is no
reason to believe that the computational process respects
our intuitions of computation that we have from our laptop
computers, or from our colorful model of “Turing machines”
with their tapes, head, internal state etc. All that matters
is that the corresponding process can in principle be sim-
ulated by a monotone Turing machine, but it is in general
unclear what its most useful or intuitive concrete represen-
tation would look like.
Nevertheless, there are some constraints that arise from
simulatability. No matter which model of computation we
use, algorithms must proceed in a sequence of finite steps
with rules that are fixed during the computation27. Every
finite step can only process a finite amount of information.
Therefore, if the amount of data in the course of computa-
tion increases (think of a Turing machine, for example, that
reads and writes larger and larger parts of its tapes), then it
must be possible to divide this data into “chunks” such that
only a few of the chunks of data interact with a few of the
others within a finite number of computational steps. Simi-
larly as the tape cells of a Turing machine, this introduces a
notion of “causal neighbors”: declare two chunks of data as
neighbors if they interact in a single step of the computation.
Drawing a graph with the “chunks of data” as the vertices
and neighborliness as the edge relation produces an (ideally,
sparse) graph that encodes the “computational space”.
It seems plausible that all “reasonable” computational
models allow for such a data representation in a non-trivial
way, and thus admit a notion of locality (though it would be
27 If these rules change over time then there must be a “meta rule” that
specifies those changes and is itself constant over time.
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a matter of thorough theoretical investigation to make sure
that this intuition is not misguided due to lack of imagina-
tion). Certainly all popular models of computation do, in-
cluding cellular automata and Turing machines, and in fact
do so in simple ways. We should, however, not expect that
the resulting notions of locality always display graphs that
are as simple or regular as the ones that correspond to our
most popular human-chosen models of computation. Con-
versely, this also means that the graph, and the way that
information propagates along it, is not necessarily best de-
scribed in terms of a spacetime that resembles the causality
of Newtonian mechanics; for example, it is perfectly possible
to arrive at Lorentz symmetry, see e.g. [96]28, or at some even
more complicated structure without any meaningful notion
of spatial dimension.
In light of these considerations, we will now assume that
Alice’s emergent computational world, as described in Sub-
section 4.2, is equipped with a notion of locality in the sense
described above. For concreteness, we can think of a cellular-
automaton-like structure. Then it makes sense to consider
scenarios as depicted in Figure 5; namely, a situation in
which there is a certain process in Alice’s vicinity A (rep-
resented by the blue box), which takes some “setting” a
(for example, a bit) and produces some “outcome” v (which
might itself be a bit, or a sequence of bits). In general, there
can be another process at a distant point B, turning some
setting b into some outcome w, which is not completely sta-
tistically independent of the process at A. A possible origin
of this statistical dependence is the existence of a random
variable λ that has been distributed to both A and B be-
forehand. For example, λ might simply originate from the
random bits on the machine’s input tape, which has been
read and transported to A and to B earlier on.
Let us assume that Alice understands her computational
world well enough to set up a situation of this kind in an
experiment-like fashion. This way, she can construct a “Bell
experiment” in her world, as depicted in Figure 5. Like in
an actual Bell experiment, we assume that she can in prin-
ciple input any bit a at A (“choose the setting a”) that she
wants, and she can manufacture all involved computational
processes such that any remotely generated bit b can be used
as the setting at B. On the one hand, she could use two
bits a and b that are freely generated locally at A and B;
for example, two random bits that are read from the input
tape and written to A and B (and nowhere else). In this
case, a and b will be uncorrelated with all random variables
except for those in their respective future “lightcones”, sat-
isfying the unique sensible definition of “free choice” that
is routinely applied in this context, cf. [97, 98]. On the
other hand, Alice could also use two bits for the settings
that are generated locally in some pseudo-random fashion
(e.g. by creating a checksum of Twitter messages that her
fellow guinea pigs have sent out close to A resp. B shortly be-
fore the experiment). Most methods of pseudo-randomness
generation should yield outcomes that resemble “truly free”
random bits, since there is no reason to expect that the
machine’s simple computational algorithm will “conspire”
with the pseudo-random variables to produce non-typical
28 In particular, there need not be a distinguished time foliation.
outcomes.
Shortly after choosing a and b, the outcomes v and w are
created locally at A resp. B. We assume that Alice knows
the value of a, and she can in principle immediately learn
the value of v. However, due to spacelike separation, she will
in general have to wait a while until she learns the values of
b and w. These outcomes will be distributed according to a
conditional probability distribution
P0(v, w|a, b) =
∑
λ
q(λ)Pλ(v, w|a, b),
where q is some probability distribution over the possible val-
ues of λ, and Pλ(v, w|a, b) = P0(v, w|a, b, λ). If the random
variable λ summarizes all randomness that is shared by A
and B, then it follows that
Pλ(v, w|a, b) = Pλ(v|a)Pλ(w|b).
In other words, P0 is a classical correlation. Not all correla-
tions in physics are classical in this sense. Quantum theory
famously predicts the existence of correlations that are not
of this form. Concretely, a correlation P (v, w|a, b) is quan-
tum (cf. e.g. [99]) if there exist Hilbert spaces HA,HB for A
and B, a joint state |ψ〉 in HA ⊗HB , orthogonal projectors
piva, pi
w
b with
∑
v pi
v
a = 1A,
∑
w pi
w
b = 1B , and pi
v
api
v′
a = δv,v′pi
v
a
as well as piwb pi
w′
b = δw,w′pi
w
b , such that
P (v, w|a, b) = 〈ψ|piva ⊗ piwb |ψ〉.
The set of quantum correlations is strictly larger than the
set of classical correlations. A simple way to see this is
the existence of Bell inequalities [16, 17, 29, 92] which are
satisfied by all classical correlations, but violated by some
quantum correlations. The CHSH inequality [92] consti-
tutes a famous example. If Ea,b is the expectation value
of v · w under the choice of settings a, b ∈ {0, 1} (concretely,
Ea,b =
∑
v,w∈{+1,−1} vwP (v, w|a, b)), then
|E0,0 + E0,1 + E1,0 − E1,1| ≤ 2.
While this inequality is satisfied by all classical correla-
tions, it is violated by some quantum correlations. In par-
ticular, there are states and projective measurements that
yield values of up to 2
√
2, which is known as the Tsirelson
bound [100, 101].
NS
PR-
boxCQ
FIG. 6. The set of non-signalling correlations (for a fixed num-
ber of parties, measurement settings, and outcomes) is a convex
polytope, here denoted NS. It contains the convex polytope of
classical correlations C, and the convex set of quantum correla-
tions Q (which is not a polytope) sits strictly in between the two.
It is a simple but important insight that the violation of
Bell inequalities (here termed “nonlocality” to comply with
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physics convention) does not allow one to communicate. This
is known as the “no signalling” principle [102, 103], that
is, the local measurement outcome probabilities at A are
independent of the choice of settings at B, and vice versa:∑
v
P (v, w|a, b) =
∑
v
P (v, w|a′, b) for all a, a′, b, w, (9)∑
w
P (v, w|a, b) =
∑
w
P (v, w|a, b′) for all a, b, b′, v. (10)
In particular, this gives us well-defined marginals (reduced
states) at A and B, namely P (w|b) in terms of (9), and
P (v|a) in terms of (10). We can also say that (9) expresses
no signalling from A to B, and (10) formalizes no signalling
from B to A.
As discovered by Tsirelson [100, 101] and Popescu and
Rohrlich [102], the no-signalling principle alone is not suffi-
cient to characterize the set of quantum correlations. That
is, the set of non-signalling correlations is strictly larger than
the set of quantum correlations. An example of stronger-
than-quantum correlations is given by a so-called Popescu-
Rohrlich box (or “PR-box” correlation)
P (−1,−1|a, b) = P (+1,+1|a, b) = 1
2
if (a, b) 6= (1, 1),
P (−1,+1|a, b) = P (+1,−1|a, b) = 1
2
if (a, b) = (1, 1)
and all other probabilities equal to zero, where both a and
b can take on the values 0 or 1. It is easy to see that this
correlation is non-signalling, i.e. satisfies (9) and (10), and
|E0,0 + E0,1 + E1,0 − E1,1| = 4
which is larger than the quantum maximum (Tsirelson
bound) of 2
√
2. In summary, we obtain the picture that
is sketched in Figure 6.
Returning to Alice’s private Bell experiment, it is clear
that the correlation P0 that governs her outcomes must be
classical. However, as we will now see, surprising effects can
happen if memory erasure becomes relevant. Since forgetting
is not treated by Postulates 3.2, but only by the desired (but
not yet formalized) Postulates 3.1, we have to say exactly
what our assumptions are in the following.
Assumption 7.2. In the following, we explore what hap-
pens if we allow “fundamental forgetting” in addition to Pos-
tulates 3.2, as anticipated by Postulates 3.1. We assume:
• It is possible that the last bit of an observer state gets
erased, denoted x− (e.g. 101− = 10).
• The probability of the next state y being either x0, x1
or x−, depends only on x.
• A version of Theorem 4.4 (emergence of an external
world) remains true in this more general context; that
is, P(y1, . . . , ym|x) ≈ µ(y1, . . . , ym|x) for µ a simple
and computable measure. Note that y1, . . . , ym is now
not a sequence of bits, but a possible sequence (grow-
ing/shrinking) of observer states.
We hence place Alice’s experiment into a world that fea-
tures fundamental erasure of memory. By doing so, we hope
to obtain a glance on a version of our theory that satisfies
the desired Postulates 3.1.
Denote Alice’s observer state at the beginning of the ex-
periment by x. Naively, think of x as a binary encoding of
something like the following:
x '[biographical memory] + “It is Tuesday, January 14,
2031, 9:00 am, as I have just seen on my wristwatch. I am
now inputting a = 0 into my half of this Bell experiment,
which is the first run of this experiment. I’m so excited to
see what happens after I’ve repeated this a thousand times
and collected all the data!”
Concretely, suppose that the computational process works
as follows during Alice’s Bell experiment (see also Figure 5):
1. Alice sees that the experiment has successfully started,
and her observer states transitions from x to x1.
2. At A and at B, a random variable λ is assessed which
has been generated, copied and transported to both
places earlier on. This variable λ has been sampled
with uniform probability 1/4 from the four-element set
λ ∈ {+∅+ +, ∅+ +−, ∅ − −+, −∅ −−}.
We use the notation λ = l0l1l
′
0l
′
1, where li ∈ {+, ∅,−}
and l′i ∈ {+,−}.
3. The outcome w = l′b ∈ {+,−} is locally generated at
B (and free to spread from there to the rest of the
computation, including, later on, to Alice).
4. If la 6= ∅ then the outcome v = la ∈ {+,−} is locally
generated, and Alice learns this outcome. That is, Al-
ice transitions into the new observer state x1z, where
z = 1 if v = + and z = 0 if v = −.
On the other hand, if la = ∅, then Alice transitions
back to her earlier state x.
If Alice’s local outcome is ∅, then she does not see this out-
come, but returns to her earlier observer state x. By defini-
tion, if this happens, then she will not become aware of what
has just happened. Remember what “being in the state x”
means: all that she sees, knows and remembers is still equal
to her earlier state. In particular, Alice will still think that
she is about to run the experiment for the first time, and
that it is 9:00am as described above.
But then, can’t Alice simply look at her wristwatch (or
some other clock) to see that some extra time has passed,
and find out in the next moment that she has just looped?
Surprisingly, the answer must be “no” due to the basic prin-
ciples formulated in Assumption 7.2: the probability of all
her future observations, P(y1y2 . . . ym|x), depends only on
x and is thus unchanged. This includes the probabilities of
what she will at any later time read from any given clock.
Everything must look for Alice as if she had travelled back
in time — or rather, as if nothing had happened at all.
This also explains why we have not specified how the com-
putational process continues if la = ∅ in step 4: the proto-
col has to repeat automatically. In the terminology of Ob-
servation 4.5, if Alice transitions into some observer state
x then this amounts to the preparation of the operational
state P(·|x). This in turn is approximately equal to the
preparation of a distribution over ontic states of a monotone
Turing machine that has just output x (and that will read
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further random input bits and generate new outputs accord-
ing µ(·|x)). All information on whether there has been a
“loop” x→ x1→ x will effectively have to be erased or hid-
den. Thus, if la = ∅ then the experiment will automatically
repeat for Alice.
In the specific example above, the conditional probability
distribution P0(v, w|a, b) = P0(vi, wi|a, b) over all possible
outcomes (including v = ∅) turns out to be the following:
P0(la, l
′
b|a, b) (a, b) = (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
(∅,−1) 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
(∅,+1) 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
(−1,−1) 1/4 1/4 1/4 0
(−1,+1) 0 0 0 1/4
(+1,−1) 0 0 0 1/4
(+1,+1) 1/4 1/4 1/4 0
This equals the convex combination
P0 =
1
4

0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
P+∅++
+
1
4

0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
P∅++−
+
+
1
4

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
P∅−−+
+
1
4

0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
P−∅−−
,
which confirms that P0 is a classical correlation. The no-
tation is such that Pλ = Pl0l1l′0l′1 denotes the deterministic
behavior that results if the random variable λ attains the
corresponding value.
By construction, however, the random experiment only
ends for Alice if her local outcome la is different from ∅ —
the experiment is repeated until this is the case. Thus, the
conditional probability P (v, w|a, b) of the outcome v 6= ∅ that
Alice eventually learns, and of the corresponding outcome w
at B, corresponds to the postselected distribution
P (v, w|a, b) = P0(v, w|a, b)
1− P0(∅|a) (v 6= ∅), (11)
where P0(∅|a) =
∑
w P0(∅, w|a, b) for all b. In the special
case above, we have P0(∅|a) = 12 and obtain
P = 2 ·
 1/4 1/4 1/4 00 0 0 1/40 0 0 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/4 0
 .
This is a nonlocal correlation — it is exactly the PR-box
correlation [100–102] that we have described above.
How is this possible? What happens in the scenario above
is a “cosmological” version of a phenomenon known as the
detection loophole [104, 105]: if the two parties A and B
in a Bell experiment have detectors that are not perfect,
then postselecting on the successful detection can reproduce
the statistics of nonlocal correlations [106]. Alice looping
into her old state, and forgetting the run of the experiment,
can be interpreted, in this instrumentalist language, as an
unsuccessful detection event (denoted ∅)29.
Our example thus shows the following:
Lemma 7.3 (Nonlocality). In the presence of “fundamen-
tal forgetting” as formulated above, our approach admits an
effective violation of Bell inequalities. This is because an ob-
server’s future states depend only on her current state, and
not on any past states or facts of the world — hence, reset-
ting the observer state amounts to effectively resetting the
world, opening up a “cosmological detection loophole”.
While a “loop” like x → x1 → x can be treated like “re-
setting the world”, it does not have to be — the final item
of Assumption 7.2 says that we can still view the state tran-
sitions, including the loop, as a single computation. That is,
there is a computational process that generates the proba-
bilities µ for all state transitions, including the loop. In this
view, however, the outcome w1 of the first run may still be
present in the computation (after all, we have assumed that
it is free to spread to the rest of the process, including Alice).
What happens if Alice learns the variable w1 at some point
later in the process? In principle, w1 could be correlated to
the non-detection event ∅1 of the first run. But then, learn-
ing w1 would teach Alice something about whether she has
looped or not — which contradicts the basic principle that
the probabilities of Alice’s future observations only depend
on her current state, and this observer state (x) is the same
regardless of whether she has looped or not. In other words,
the conditional independence relation
∅1 ⊥ w1|a, b
must hold in order to satisfy all premises of Assumption 7.2.
But as we show in Lemma A.1 in the appendix, this has an
interesting consequence:
Lemma 7.4 (No signalling). In the Bell scenario described
above, Alice’s effective distribution P (v, w|a, b) must be non-
signalling. Otherwise, if it was not, this would allow Alice to
obtain some information on her earlier states (whether she
has “looped” or not), which would contradict the principle
that the probabilities of her future states only depend on her
current state and nothing else.
The derivation above contains a fair amount of speculation
and handwaving — after all, it is not clear whether a suitable
29 There are also other possible ways to interpret this result. For ex-
ample, postselecting on Alice’s outcome will in general lead to cor-
relations between the settings a, b and the hidden variable λ, which
is an instance of Berkson’s paradox [107]: “conditioning on a vari-
able induces statistical correlations between its causal parents when
they are otherwise uncorrelated” [108]. These correlations in turn
lead to the violation of the assumption of free local choice of settings
which underlie the derivation of Bell inequalities. However, as ex-
plained above, this does not prevent Alice from inputting whatever
a she likes into her half of the experiment; it rather allows her to
effectively intervene on λ, but not in a way that could be used for
signalling, as we will soon see.
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version of our theory can be constructed that satisfies all the
premises of Assumption 7.2, and that still reproduces most of
the results of the earlier sections. Let us nonetheless continue
with one further step of speculation, since it will lead us to
a more coherent overall picture.
So far, we have derived nonlocality and no signalling di-
rectly from first principles. But how concretely does the
computational process work that generates the correspond-
ing probability measure µ? To see why this computation
must be to some extent counterintuitive, consider a Bell ex-
periment that is carried out by our civilization of guinea pigs.
Suppose that Alice is in fact an astronaut, one light year
away from earth (at some place called A), and she is part of
an astronomical Bell test. Suppose that physics is immensely
popular in guinea pig world, and the runs of the Bell test are
broadcast live on TV. Millions of guinea pigs gather in their
cities for public viewing, and cheer and dance, with dance
moves depending on the local outcomes w (at their planet,
place B) as they are reported one after the other (they will
learn Alice’s outcomes only one year later). In such a world,
what do the different “pseudo outcomes” wi (cf. Figure 5)
correspond to? In what sense is only one of the wi the “real”
one that is paired up with v?
It seems as if the machine, in order to satisfy all the
premises of Assumption 7.2, will somehow have to do its
local computation at B in a way that processes all possible
“numbers of loopings” in parallel. Consequently, the ma-
chine will have to compute all the different behaviors of the
guinea pig world for all possibilities. That is, similarly as
in a “many-worlds” scenario, the machine has to simulate
different “versions” of the guinea pig civilization. Only later
on, when the computational light cones of A and B intersect
(such that Alice learns b and w, and the guinea pigs at home
learn her setting a and outcome v) will the correct “pair-
ing” be established — Alice will only see the one realization
of her home planet (and its civilization) that corresponds to
the correct number of loopings, and conceivably vice versa30.
We can see this as a hint on the natural model of compu-
tation for processes that generate probability measures that
allow forgetting and realize Postulates 3.1. To understand
the main idea of such a “natural model”, recall some of the
discussion in Section 2. Imagine a generic Turing machine,
with an arbitrary number of input and output tapes. In gen-
eral, we can program the machine to read and write its tapes
in any way we like. In particular, there is in general no guar-
antee that output bits are written successively; instead, it
can happen that some bits are written, then some of the bits
get erased, then some other bits are written etc. But if we
tried to define a notion of algorithmic probability as in Def-
inition 2.1, then this would bring us into trouble: it would
be impossible to write down a unique, natural definition of
“probability that the output starts with x”, where x ∈ S is
some string, if such arbitrary output behavior was possible.
The solution in algorithmic information theory is then to in-
30 Note that we are talking here about “Alice’s private external world”;
the fact that other guinea pigs see that world as well is an emergent
phenomenon that happens only under certain circumstances, see the
discussion in Subsection 5.1. How memory erasure and the resulting
phenomena of this section combine with this notion of “emergent
objective reality” is a separate question to be studied in future work.
troduce a restriction on the Turing machine’s “hardware”:
namely, that input and output tapes are unidirectional, such
that one bit after the other has to be read and written. This
leads to a notion of “monotone Turing machine”, and the
working of this type of machine guarantees that it generates
a probability distribution with the desired properties.
While the monotone Turing machine model guarantees
that the output statistics corresponds to a (semi)measure,
we can imagine that there is another model of computation
which generates a probability distribution that additionally
allows for memory erasure, satisfying all the conditions of
Assumption 7.2. I do not currently know what such a model
of computation would have to look like, but the discussion
above gives us a few hints. Interestingly, the main charac-
teristics of the computational behavior sketched above has
recently appeared in the field of quantum foundations as
a possible local realist model of quantum theory [109–111].
Since that model does not fall into the usual class of hid-
den variable models, its existence is not ruled out by Bell’s
theorem.
Observation 7.5 (A machine model of parallel processes?).
Suppose that we would like to modify the monotone Tur-
ing machine model to accommodate for processes of memory
erasure. Then the discussion above suggests that this com-
putational model will perhaps exhibit features that resemble
those of Brassard and Raymond-Robichaud’s [109–111] local
realist (non-hidden-variable) model of quantum theory (see
also the colorful PR-box illustration in [110]). That is, mul-
tiple realizations of local physical processes will be computed
in parallel and only some of them will later interact.
It would be interesting to work out the details of such
a model of computation, and to compare its properties to
those of quantum computers. In particular, one might want
to analyze which problems can be solved on such a machine
in polynomial time (where “time” should possibly be mea-
sured with respect to clocks of observers that are part of the
computation, as Figure 5 suggests), and how this class of
problems would compare to the complexity class BQP.
While we have argued in Observation 4.5 that observers’
experiences are described by a “computational ontological
model” which we can interpret as an “external world”, the
observer herself will typically not organize her experiences in
terms of this “noumenal” model, as we have just seen. This
is because some aspects of this model are hidden in principle
to the observer, as soon as memory erasure and “cycles” are
possible. Instead, the observer may use an effective (“phe-
nomenal”) description that summarizes only those aspects
that she can in principle record and remember. In situations
like the “private Bell test” of Figure 5, this means that the
observer will use non-classical conditional probability distri-
butions (corresponding to the postselected distribution P ) to
describe probabilities of events in her world. The idea is that
these conditional distributions may ultimately correspond to
quantum states.
There are obviously many open questions regarding the
relation between our approach and quantum theory. First,
how far can we get in deriving the structure of quantum the-
ory from considerations like the ones above, such that the
aforementioned “non-classical conditional probability distri-
butions” correspond to quantum states? Some progress on
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this question might come from constructing the computa-
tional model mentioned in Observation 7.5, but it may well
be that the exact structure of quantum theory is a contingent
feature, similarly as the exact choice of asymptotic measure
µ in Theorem 4.4 will in general be merely random (though
with a strong bias towards algorithmic simplicity).
There are nonetheless some hints that we might hope for
stronger results. One such hint is given by the recent wave
of reconstructions of the formalism of quantum theory from
simple information-theoretic postulates [19–28] mentioned at
the beginning of this section. Similarly, there is progress in
delineating the quantum correlations from the set of all non-
signalling correlations in terms of simple principles [112–117].
What we can learn from these reconstructions is that a few
simple and intuitive constraints on encoding and processing
of information will automatically lead to (aspects of) the
Hilbert space formalism of quantum theory. Perhaps these
principles can be understood as unavoidable strategies of ob-
servers who try to place rational bets on future data records
in computational worlds that have the counterintuitive prop-
erties described above.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, I have argued that several puzzles and in-
sights from modern physics and related fields motivate the
exploration of a new type of “first-person-first” theories, and
I have presented a blueprint of a simple theory of this kind.
As I have emphasized in Section 3, the approach of this pa-
per does not yet give a full-fledged theory that has all the
properties that one would like it to have; in particular, it is
not yet able to treat processes of “forgetting” or “memory
erasure”, and Section 7 suggests that such processes might
be of fundamental importance.
Despite its incompleteness, it seems fair to say that the
theory as presented here has shown a surprising variety of
predictive and explanatory power: it explains in some sense
“why” we see a simple, computable, probabilistic external
world; it predicts the emergence of objective reality as an
asymptotic statistical phenomenon; and it makes concrete
predictions for exotic enigmas like the Boltzmann brain prob-
lem or the computer simulation of agents. We have also seen
that it is consistent with quantum theory, and (under some
assumptions) able to predict some of its generic features (Bell
violation and no-signalling). Moreover, it describes a very
surprising yet elegant and consistent ontology of the world
in which observers are not “objects in some universe”, but
abstract structure. Due to this novel perspective, it pre-
dicts unforeseen phenomena like subjective immortality or
“probabilistic zombies”, a phenomenon so counterintuitive
(yet consistent) that it has not even appeared in the science
fiction literature yet.
Therefore, regardless of the question of whether “the world
is really as crazy as that”, this approach expands our imag-
ination and demonstrates that our usual ways of addressing
puzzles in the foundations of physics have perhaps been more
limited than we thought. My hope is that the results of this
paper give us a glimpse on generic properties of all theories
“of this kind”, even if particular details of the approach as
presented in this paper will need revision.
A major revision in future work will be to tweak the defini-
tions such that the fundamental postulates include memory
erasure, formalizing Postulates 3.1. It seems likely that such
an improvement necessitates a different definition of “ob-
server states”: these states will need to contain more struc-
ture than just being finite binary strings. However, what one
should arguably not do is to simply write down a seemingly
realistic definition of observers that is motivated, say, by the
contingent detailed features of human observers: the goal is
not to make a model, but to uncover the true fundamental
mathematical nature of “what it means to be an observer”.
Adding seemingly realistic bells and whistles to definitions
is not the way to go in the ultimate foundational regime
targeted by such a kind of theory.
The “idealistic” approach of this paper contrasts with our
current way of doing science which reflects Cartesian dual-
ism in a methodological sense: the empirical realm of physics
and the first-person realm of, say, the philosophy of mind
are treated as separate and, in many cases, irreconcilable
regimes. This is not always a bad idea — quite on the con-
trary. Banning the first-person perspective from physics was
one of the major prerequisites for its success, and some at-
tempts to unify both regimes are arguably overly speculative.
But keeping the two regimes separate may not be the best
strategy under all circumstances. One such circumstance
which is arguably becoming increasingly relevant is the de-
velopment of computer technology, and with it the prospect
that disturbing technologies like brain emulation might be-
come available in the not so distant future. We need good
theories that allow us to give precise answers to some urgent
questions that arise in this context. In a complementary
development, the first-person perspective has shown up in
physics despite its initial banishment, manifesting itself in
questions like: what should observers expect to see in a very
“large” universe? How can we make sense of the fact that the
notion of measurement seems to play a special role in quan-
tum mechanics? These questions are hard to address since
most conceivable answers cannot be easily tested empirically.
But if we are careful and aim for mathematical rigor, sim-
plicity of assumptions, and consistency with known physics,
then we may hope to obtain some valuable insights that span
both regimes. As I have argued in the introduction, having
an approach of this kind will have the advantage that we
can test its predictions in one regime (of physics), and thus
increase our confidence in its predictions in the other regime
(of the first-person perspective).
This work also helps to refute a common criticism which
is faced by broadly epistemic approaches to physics (like
QBism), namely the reproach of being “solipsistic”. This
is simply a fancy catchphrase subsuming the following ob-
jection: How can you deny the relevance of an objective ex-
ternal world, given that this notion is so obviously successful
and important in physics? What the approach of this paper
shows is that one can successfully deny the fundamentality
of the notion of an objective external world, and obtain it
as an emergent phenomenon from weaker assumptions. As
shown above, this “methodological solipsism” even allows us
to address questions that are otherwise difficult to address.
The results of this paper are an invitation to take a bolder
perspective on some foundational questions. Relying strictly
on our traditional view of the world might not be the right
strategy under all circumstances; perhaps we are missing
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something truly important, as the conceptual questions of
Table 1 seem to suggest. Exploring alternatives, in a math-
ematically rigorous way that prevents us from fooling our-
selves, may well yield surprising insights that are crucial for
solving some important problems that lie ahead.
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Appendix A: Appendix
The following criterion for no-signalling is used in Section 7:
Lemma A.1. Consider a Bell experiment involving two parties, Alice and Bob, choosing among settings a and b and
obtaining outcomes x ∈ X and y ∈ Y respectively. Furthermore, suppose that Bob’s detector is perfect, but Alice’s detector
sometimes refuses to fire, which we formalize by an additional non-detection outcome ‘∅’. Set X¯ := X ∪ {∅}.
Suppose that there is an actual non-signalling correlation P0(x¯, y|a, b) that determines the probabilities of all outcomes
x¯ ∈ X¯, y ∈ Y , and that P0(∅|a) < 1 for all a. Define the postselected correlation P by [105]
P (x, y|a, b) := P0(x, y|a, b)
1− P0(∅|a) (x ∈ X, y ∈ Y ) .
Then P is non-signalling from Bob to Alice, i.e. the conditional probability distribution P (x|a) is automatically well-defined.
However, P may in general be signalling from Alice to Bob. Yet, if the condition
P0(∅, y|a, b) = P0(∅|a) · P0(y|b) (A1)
is satisfied, then P is also non-signalling from Alice to Bob. This condition can also be written
∅ ⊥ y|a, b, (A2)
i.e. it states that Alice’s non-detection event and Bob’s outcome are to be conditionally independent, given the settings.
A comment on the notation: the event “∅” can be understood as a binary random variable which takes the value “yes”
if x¯ = ∅ and “no” if x¯ 6= ∅. Then (A2) is just an ordinary conditional independence relation between random variables. In
particular, it is sufficient to check factorization for the “yes”-outcome due to the following implication for arbitrary discrete
random variables X,Y, Z which is straightforward to verify:
P (X = x0, Y |Z) = P (X = x0|Z) · P (Y |Z) ⇒ P (X 6= x0, Y |Z) = P (X 6= x0|Z) · P (Y |Z).
Proof. Using that P0 is non-signalling, we get∑
y∈Y
P (x, y|a, b) =
∑
y∈Y P0(x, y|a, b)
1− P0(∅|a) =
∑
y∈Y P0(x, y|a, b′)
1− P0(∅|a) =
∑
y∈Y
P (x, y|a, b′) for all x ∈ X, a, b, b′,
that is, P is non-signalling from Bob to Alice. We also have∑
x∈X
P (x, y|a, b) =
∑
x¯∈X¯ P0(x¯, y|a, b)− P0(∅, y|a, b)
1− P0(∅|a) =
P0(y|b)− P0(∅, y|a, b)
1− P0(∅|a) ,
and if we assume eq. (A1), then this simplifies to P0(y|b), which is manifestly independent of a for all y ∈ Y, b. No-signalling
of P0 also implies that P0(∅|a) = P0(∅|a, b) and P0(y|b) = P0(y|a, b), such that (A1) is equivalent to (A2).
